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Introduction
This thesis is the outcome of the three-year work done during the Ph.D. course in
"Electronics, Telecommunications and Information Technologies Engineering". The
main research topic is focused on cooperative interference countermeasures in Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).
Due to the low cost of GNSS receivers and their consequent diffusion, a wide
range of location-aware applications are arising. Some of these applications are crit-
ical and have strict requirements in terms of availability, integrity and reliability.
Examples of critical applications are precision landing and en-route navigation in
air transportations; automated highways and mileage-based toll in road transporta-
tions; search and rescue in safety of life applications. A failure in fulfilling one or
more requirements of a critical application may have dramatic consequences and
cause serious damage. One of the most challenging threats for critical GNSS ap-
plication, is represented by interference. In particular, jamming devices, operating
inside GNSS bands, are easily and cheaply purchasable on the Internet. These de-
vices transmit disturbing signals with the aim of preventing the correct operations of
GNSS receivers. In order to satisfy the requirements of critical applications, it is nec-
essary to promptly detect, localize and remove such interfering sources. Moreover,
it is important to characterize the interfering signals in order to develop interference
avoidance and mitigation techniques that ensure robustness of GNSS receivers to
interference.
This work is organized as follows. The Introduction discusses the problem of
interference in GNSS and gives the motivation for this work.
Chapter 1 tackles the problems of interference detection and localization. These
problems are solved by a novel family of algorithms in a joint and cooperative fashion.
Chapter 2 treats the interference mitigation problem. The chapter illustrates two
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interference mitigation techniques, one based on the cooperative interfering waveform
estimation and the other based on multisensor integration.
Chapter 3 describes a novel synchronization technique suitable for low-cost software-
defined radios. The synchronization technique allows for an easy and accessible im-
plementation of navigation-related applications.
Chapter 4 contains the conclusions.
Appendix A provides the useful theoretical background.
GNSS applications
The worldwide availability and accuracy of GNSS for location and timing, has made
GNSS the preferred solution for a wide and growing range of applications in disparate
fields: i.e., transport, law enforcement, highways management, health services, fi-
nancial services, information services, cartography, safety monitoring, scientific and
environmental studies, search and rescue, telecommunications, and asset tracking. In
the road transport field GNSS is used for in-car navigation, commercial fleet manage-
ment, taxi services, public transport monitoring, emergency vehicle location, distance
based charging systems. In aviation, GNSS is currently used in commercial aircrafts
for en-route navigation and approaches to enabled airports (e.g., using European geo-
stationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS)); automatic dependent surveillance
- broadcast (ADS-B) is used in the areas where there is no radar coverage; this in-
volves aircrafts calculating their position using GNSS and inertial navigation systems
and broadcasting it to other aircrafts. Scientific applications include surveying, en-
vironmental and atmosphere monitoring, animal behavior studies, meteorology and
climate research. GNSS timing is of paramount importance for telecommunications
applications. Synchronous technologies require a time source with appropriate accu-
racy, stability and reliability and GNSS is the preferred synchronization solution.
A few of the aforementioned applications are critical, a failure affecting any of
these applications may lead to hazardous situations, risk of death, or extensive dam-
age or losses. Indeed, critical applications have typically strict requirements in terms
of accuracy, availability, and integrity. On the other hand, the intrinsic vulnera-
bility of GNSS signals to interference, makes the fulfilment of these requirements a
challenging task [1]. For this reason, the issue of interference has been extensively
investigated and studied by the scientific community. The next section provides a
classification of the most common interfering sources.
7Interfering sources
The first and intuitive classification is based on intention. Interfering sources can be
organized in unintentional and intentional: the former is the accidental or undesired
transmission of radio-frequency signals over one or more GNSS bands; the latter is
the deliberate transmission of disturbing or malicious signals to disrupt or mislead
GNSS receivers.
Unintentional interference
Unintentional interference can be further classified into natural or man-made inter-
ference. The former is due to natural phenomena, such as solar radiation bursts. As
an example, in 2006 a solar flare caused the unavailability of GPS signals over a large
area of the globe, as reported in [2]. Man-made unintentional interference typically
arises from malfunction of electronic devices. As an example tv broadcasters are
potential interference source because higher order harmonics fall in GNSS bands. In
addition, falls in this category the intrinsic interference caused by the coexistence of
GNSS and traditional aircraft navigation systems, such as distance measuring equip-
ment (DME) and tactical air navigation (TACAN), as they transmit in the proximity
of the L5/E5A band [3]. Other unintentional man-made sources are due to weather
and radar systems.
Intentional interference
Intentional interference can be further split in two categories, jamming and spoofing.
Jamming is the transmission of a disturbing signal in one or more GNSS bands
with the objective to overwhelm nearby receivers [2], [4]. Depending on the power
of jamming signals at the receivers, the interferer may cause a deterioration of the
position solution accuracy, or undermine its availability.
Spoofing is the transmission of counterfeit GNSS signals in order to deceive re-
ceivers [5]. In this dissertation we focus on jammers as they are more likely to affect
civil GNSS user [2].
Civil GNSS jammers
Civil GNSS jammers can generate a variety of different waveforms. According to [4]
the waveforms can be classified based on their complexity:
• Class I, continuous wave;
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• Class II, chirp with one saw-tooth function;
• Class III, chirp with multiple saw-tooth functions;
• Classe IV, chirp with frequency-hopping.
Class I jammers are the most simple ones. They transmit a tone, i.e., a continuous
wave signal. This kind of waveform is very narrowband and easy to mitigate. More
harmful jammers are the ones of Class II, III, and IV. They transmit wideband
swept-frequency continuous wave signal (i.e., chirp signals). An example of Class II
jamming signal is shown in Figure 1 [2]. The radio-frequency carrier is modulated
by a single saw-tooth function, resulting in a bandwidth of about 12 MHz around
the L1/E1 center frequency. The waveform repeats with a chirp period of 8 µs.
According to [6], most of the jammers are modulated by a single saw-toot function.
Even Class III jammers are ideally modulated by a single saw-tooth function, multiple
saw-tooths arise due to the nonlinearities in jammers front-ends.
Civil jammers are usually available for purchase on the Internet as personal pri-
vacy devices (PPD). These kind of devices promise to disable GNSS receivers in order
to avoid tracking [7], [4]. PPD feature peak transmit powers from a few milliwatts
to tens of Watts. They are usually installed in vehicles and are intended to make
GNSS signals unavailable within a few tens of meters around the jammer. However
evidence show that these devices cause problems well beyond the nominal operating
range [6], [7]. A few examples of in-car jammers are shown in Figure 2 [4].
Cheap in-car jammers have been involved in a few incidents in the past. In
the late 2009, the ground bases augmentation system (GBAS) of Newark Liberty
International Airport (New Jersey, USA) was suffering from brief daily outages due
to the emissions of an in-car jammer used in a vehicle traveling on the nearby highway.
[8]. A measurement campaign conducted in London in 2012, showed the presence of
jamming events repeating every working day at the same time [2]. In April 2012,
the police in Kent (UK) had arrested a gang of car thieves responsible for the theft
of more than 150 high-valued vehicles. The thieves where using GNSS jammers to
disable in-car tracking systems. In November 2013 a Melbourne newspaper reported
the that a hundred of taxi drivers where using jammers in order to fool their employer
company into giving them jobs, even if they were not in the area. The devices
were discovered as they were interfering with the receivers of nearby police cars and
ambulances.
These incidents suggest that the threat represented by jammers should not be
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underestimated. With a growing number of new applications relying on GNSS, we
expect an increase of jammer events frequency. Therefore, it is important to develop
suitable jammer detection, localization and mitigation techniques.
The following section describes the adopted jamming signal model that will be
used in this dissertation.
Jamming signal model
Jammer interfering signals are generated through phase/frequency modulation of a
sine wave with a generic periodic signal z(t), with period Tj . For civil jammers z(t)
is typically a periodic saw-tooth waveform, expressed as:
z(t) = fi + (ff − fi)
(
1
2
+
t− Tj/2
Tj
−
⌊1
2
+
t− Tj/2
Tj
⌋)
(1)
where fi and ff are the initial and final frequencies, respectively, and Tj is the chirp
period. A jamming signal can be represented according to [9].
s(t) = A(t) exp {j [2pifct+ ϕ(t)]} (2)
where A(t), fc, and φ(t) represent amplitude, carrier frequency and phase ofd the
signal, respectively.
ϕ(t) =
 2pi
∫ t
0
z(ξ) dξ for FM signals (3a)
z(t) for PM signals (3b)
Since the modulating signal is periodic with period Tj , it can be written as
z(t) =
+∞∑
k=−∞
z0 (t− kTj) (4)
with z0(t) null outside [0, Tj ]. If the signal amplitude is slowly varying, it is safe to
assume it constant within each repetition period:
A(t) = Ak ∈ R, t ∈ [kTj , (k + 1)Tj [ (5)
and the jamming signal can be expressed as
s(t) =
+∞∑
k=−∞
AkS0(t− kTj)ejφk (6)
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with
S0(t) = 1[0,Tj [(t)
 exp
{
j2pi
[
fct+
∫ t
0
z0(ξ) dξ
]}
FM signals (7a)
exp {j [2pifct+ z0(t)]} PM signals (7b)
φk =
 2pi
[
fckTj + k
∫ Tj
0
z0(ξ) dξ
]
for FM signals (8a)
2pifcktj for PM signals (8b)
where 1[a,b[(t) is the indicator function defined as:
1[a,b[(t) =
{
1 if t ∈ [a, b[ (9a)
0 if t /∈ [a, b[ (9b)

Chapter1
Joint Interference Detection and
Localization
Several countermeasures to interference have been studied since the early days of
GNSS. The first necessity is to detect the presence of interference, which as a min-
imum allows to reduce the trust on the position velocity and time (PVT) solution.
But this may not be sufficient in many application scenarios, particularly those in
which integrity must be preserved by civil/military servants. In these conditions, lo-
calization of the interference source is also essential, in order to identify and resolve
the problem at its roots. For This purpose, cooperation between different nodes can
be conceived. Before going into the details of our solution to the interference detec-
tion and localization problem. we shall review the main state-of-the-art techniques
in this topic.
1.0.1 Interference detection
In the literature, interference detectors are mostly implemented into GNSS signal
processing chains. At the expense of additional hardware, other architectures could
integrate sensors (e.g., inertial navigation systems) to cross-check the position solu-
tion or use multiple antennas to distinguish the angles of arrival. Hereinafter, we
focus on cost-effective detection methods, which are performed either by processing
the whole pre-correlation signal or by monitoring the post-correlation and channel-
specific measurements available.
Detectors based on pre-correlation observables (i.e., computed before despread-
ing), share an inherent advantage: they do not require any a-priori knowledge of the
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jamming waveform. They search the incoming signal for interference by examining
either the quantized amplitude levels at the automatic gain control (AGC) output or
the raw data captured at baseband, or at intermediate frequency (IF). As proposed
in [10], the adaptive digitization loop is a valuable tool for assessing the presence of
jammers within the processing chain of a standard receiver. Nevertheless, this stage
is not specifically designed to cope with interference: its dynamic range falls short
of flexibility, because either the quantization accuracy or the additional resolution
could be insufficient. Alternatively, other pre-correlation detectors inspect the raw
data of the analog-to-digital converter (ADC), in order to test the noise-like prop-
erties of the interference-free GNSS signal. Indeed, temporal correlations between
samples, distortions of the power spectral density (PSD), and inconsistent statistics
are evidence of possible radio-frequency interference (RFI). In this category fall the
conventional detection and excision methods, which analyze the energy computed
in either the time or the frequency domains, as described in [11] [12] [13] [14] [15].
Similarly, recent and promising techniques proposed in [16] [17] [18] analyze the
intensity of a time-frequency representation of the signal. However, regardless of
the domain, energy detectors are limited by the noise level uncertainty. Therefore,
their decision threshold depends on the real-time estimation of the time-varying noise
variance, other methods provide non-parametric RFI detection and may be referred
to as blind. For instance, the spectrum-sensing technique in [19] takes a decision
depending on the eigenvalues of the covariance sample matrix. Another example is
the chi-square goodness-of-fit test exploited in [20], which assumes that a zero-mean
white Gaussian process can model the received GNSS signal, as it is dominated by
noise, in the absence of interference and multipath fading.
As opposed to pre-correlation observables, jamming attacks can be revealed also
by combining several post-correlation measurements derived for each channel, al-
though the despreading operation generally reduces detection performance and re-
sponsiveness. In [21], the estimated correlator output power is the only candidate
test statistics showing consistent performance with continuous, pulsed, and broad-
band interference, but it requires the calculation of the receiver-specific expected
noise floor. A more sophisticated approach is presented in [22], which detects RFI
at the tracking loop by examining the autocorrelation peak shape through a multi-
correlator receiver. In [23], the presence of jammers can be determined based on the
positioning error estimated through the time difference between pseudo-range and
carrier phase. This estimation process features low sensitivity to the jammer char-
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acteristics, however it inevitably introduces a significant delay. A well-established
technique is presented in [24] based on monitoring the channel carrier-to-noise spec-
tral density ratio (CN0), which is estimated from the relative signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) measured for each visible satellite. The purpose is taking advantage of the fea-
tures of off-the-shelf commercial GNSS receivers. Even though commercial receivers
usually provide CN0 values, yet their internal estimation process is unknown. There-
fore, the channel thresholds are designed by resorting to an information-demanding
statistical characterization of the CN0 curve against satellite elevation angles. Fur-
thermore, separate CN0 estimates cannot provide reliable detection, since they do
not distinguish between drops in GNSS signal strength and rise in interference power,
as asserted in [25]. They are meaningful in well-surveyed static scenarios only. For
example in [26], in-car jammers are detected by measuring SNR levels by means
of stations placed along roadside. As far as dynamic scenarios are concerned, CN0
values of multiple satellites should rather be collectively taken into account with a
unique decision metric. A sum of squared CN0 variations is proposed in [27], under
the assumption that jammers cause correlated changes in all the channels.
All of the above methods foresee a receiver working in isolation. However, in
particular for mission critical applications, it is conceivable to deploy a network of
cooperating nodes, which can provide decisive performance improvement.
1.0.2 Interference localization
Once the detector flags a jamming attempt, the position of the interference source
is determined, possibly leading to the removal of the device responsible of the event.
Here, we consider the techniques employing a network of sensor nodes and a fusion
center (FC), equipped with more computation power, which collects data from the
nodes and performs signal processing.
Traditional localization techniques are mainly based on ranging: the distance be-
tween the transmitter and each receiver is estimated from either the power, delay, or
bearing of the interference, with little or no a-priori knowledge about the waveform
of interest. These measurements are compared in terms of dilution of precision in
[28]. On the one hand, the effectiveness of the differential received signal strength
(DRSS) scheme, depends on the accuracy of the underlying propagation model, the
level of noise, and the geometry of node deployment. On the other hand, time differ-
ence of arrival (TDOA) calculated through cross-correlation guarantees superior and
reliable performance, even in the presence of multipath fading, at the expense of a
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heavier communication and computational burden. For the same reasons mentioned
regarding detection, we neglect angle of arrival, which requires multiple antennas for
beamforming. The authors of [29] use both power and time information for detect-
ing and localizing a jammer. However, they obtain the DRSS from the amplitude
quantized levels of the AGC. As a result, due to the aforementioned non-linearity of
the AGC voltage, the power/distance relation has some intrinsic boundaries, beyond
which the position solution results inaccurate or impossible. They also employ hy-
perbolic localization thorough TDOA, similarly to [30, 31], under the assumption
that all nodes running independently are strictly synchronized among themselves.
Such a scheme indeed relies on the fine alignment of all the data streams in both
time and frequency. In principle, this requirement could be fulfilled through the
GNSS time solution in the interference-free sections of each signal record. However,
since RFI is likely to be excessive, every node usually resort to a coarse alignment by
estimating the current time from its internal clock. Another requirement underlying
the TDOA scheme regards the communication bandwidth necessary for transferring
the datasets of each node to the FC, which performs the cross-correlation. In [32], a
technique is presented to relax the demand for bandwidth, by partially distributing
the computational load among the nodes. This method accurately tracks a single
jammer by means of an extended Kalman filter (EKF), which makes use of TDOA
measurements obtained as the time when the interfering tone passes through a chosen
frequency. Nevertheless, this technique implies that the jammer waveform is known.
On the contrary, the approach presented here, combines the use of an EKF with the
adoption of the DRSS scheme. This solution enables the localization of the interfer-
ence source with minimum computational burden and data exchange, regardless of
the jammer characteristics.
1.1 Joint jammer detection and localization algorithm
This chapter describes a novel technique, called joint jammer detection and local-
ization (JJDL), for simultaneously detecting and localizing a single jammer through
the cooperation of low-complexity nodes. The original concept for the JJDL algo-
rithm was to use the notion of system observability for jammer detection. in the
observability-driven joint jammer detection and localization (O-JJDL) algorithm
[P1], the nodes are equipped with an energy detector (ED) and they take a par-
tial decision on the absence/ presence of a jammer. Moreover, they estimate the
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normalised distance from the potential jammer and send it to a FC. The FC, based
on the degree of observability of an EKF, takes an aggregate decision on the pres-
ence or absence of a jammer. In case a jammer is detected, a second EKF estimates
the jammer’s position. However, this initial concept of JJDL algorithm presented a
few issues and it is reported here merely for historical reasons. Those issues have
been solved in the improved version of the algorithm, called innovation-driven joint
jammer detection and localization (I-JJDL) [P2].
In the I-JJDL algorithm, each node collects simple observables from the incoming
raw signal samples, these observables are a function of the distance from the interfer-
ence source and/or relative velocity of the jammer. The observables are then sent to a
FC, where an EKF tracks the source position (and velocity), even in dynamic scenar-
ios. Concurrently, the observation of the filter innovation provides a non-parametric
test statistics for jamming detection, which is both independent from the waveform
characteristics and robust to the noise level uncertainty. The decision threshold can
be conveniently set in order to obtain a constant false alarm rate (CFAR). Moreover,
as proven by simulation results, this metric has also a high detection capability, and
yet it is fast in revealing jammer presence.
1.2 System model
We consider an area of interest that must be kept free from interference sources,
identified as service area (SA). The SA, of size l×l, is populated withM sensor nodes,
which have known positions and unitary antenna gains. They monitor a selected
GNSS band, store signal samples, and are able to communicate with the FC. The
communication link between the FC and the nodes is not object of this dissertation
and, therefore, it is assumed as ideal. For the sake of simplicity the considered
scenario is two-dimensional. The extension to three dimensions is straightforward.
A jammer starts transmitting an unknown waveform, with carrier frequency fc at
time instant tJ from an unknown location within the SA. Figure 1.1 shows a generic
scenario: the i-th sensor node, located in (Xi, Yi) is depicted as a white dot, the
jammer located in (X,Y ), is depicted as a black dot, and di is the distance between
them. The goal of the JJDL method is to reveal the presence of a potential jammer
and to estimate its location. For this purpose, we model the detection problem as a
binary decision problem with the following hypotheses:
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(X1, Y1)
(X2, Y2)
(Xi, Yi)
(XM , YM )
(X,Y )
di
x
y
Figure 1.1: Scenario
{
H0, Jammer absent (1.1a)
H1, Jammer present. (1.1b)
The hypothesis H0 describes an interference-free scenario, while the hypothesis H1
represents the presence of a jammer. In absence of interference, nodes will receive
the GNSS signal plus the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) term ni(t). In
the presence of interference, nodes will also receive the jamming waveform sr.i(t).
Therefore, the signal received by the i-th node can be written as:
ri(t) =
{
ni(t), if H0 holds (1.2a)
sr,i(t) + ni(t), if H1 holds (1.2b)
whose discrete-time formulation is given by
ri =
{
ni, if H0 holds (1.3a)
sr,i + ni, if H1 holds, (1.3b)
In the following, we present first the original concept of the algorithm (O-JJDL) and
then the improved version (I-JJDL)
1.3 Observability-driven JJDL algorithm
The O-JJDL algorithm consists of three main phases:
(i) Energy detection;
(ii) Aggregate decision;
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(iii) Jammer localization.
In the first phase, each node measures the received power and takes a partial
decision on the absence or presence of an interfering signal. Whenever the detection
is asserted, the single node estimates a measure of its distance di from the jammer.
During the second phase, an EKF takes an aggregate decision on the same hypothesis.
If the aggregate decision is asserted, the position of jammer is recursively estimated
with higher accuracy by a second EKF.
1.3.1 Energy detection
Each node is equipped with an ED and is able to decide if an interfering signal
is present (Hˆ1) or absent (Hˆ0), with a given constant false alarm probability Pfa,
as explained in appendix A.2. According to this partial decision, the radiometer
converts the received power into an observable yi, defined as:
yi =

c
4pifc
α
√
Pt
T (ri)− PN if Hˆ1 (1.4a)
Y if Hˆ0 (1.4b)
where c is the light velocity in vacuum, fc is the jammer carrier frequency, Pt is
the jammer transmit power, PN is the receiver noise power, Y is an arbitrary large
number, and T (ri) is the test statistics of the ED, i.e. the average squared magnitude
of N samples of the received signal:
T (ri) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
|ri[n]|2 (1.5)
In the following, the path-loss exponent is set to α = 2 for simplicity but it can be
fitted to the desired propagation environment. Since the jamming transmit power
is unknown, we are unable to determine the true distance between nodes and the
jammer. Instead, we suppose a transmit power of 1W. This assumption leads to
inevitable errors in the interferer’s position estimation, which do not affect detection
performance. This issue of positioning accuracy is later resumed and addressed in
the localization stage of the algorithm. A diagram summarizing the operation of each
individual node is shown in Figure 1.2. Although it is easy to detect a high power
interfering signals by means of energy detectors, this becomes quite challenging when
the received signal power is comparable with noise power. In this case, indeed, the
decision threshold results to be very low and false alarms are very likely to occur. A
combined solution capable of solving this issue is presented in the next subsection.
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1
N
NX
n=1
|ri[n]|2ri
Hˆ1
?
Hˆ0
⇠ Hˆ1 true?
YES
NO
Normalized 
distance 
estimation
yi
yi = Y
Figure 1.2: O-JJDL node block diagram
1.3.2 Aggregate decision
The detection Kalman filter’s unknown state vector to be estimated is composed by
the jammer’s coordinates, xk = (Xk, Yk)T . Here the index k indicates a generic
EKF iteration. The equations describing the optimal EKF (see §A.1) are{
xˆ−k = Akxˆk−1 + Bkuk (1.6a)
P−k = AkPk−1A
T
k + Qk (1.6b)

Kk = P
−
k H
T
k
(
HkP
−
k H
T
k + Rk
)−1 (1.7a)
xˆk = xˆ
−
k + Kk
(
yk −Hkxˆ−k
)
(1.7b)
Pk = P
−
k −KkHkP−k (1.7c)
where xˆ−k and xˆk are the a-priori and a-posteriori state estimates, respectively; Ak is
the state transition matrix describing the evolution of the system in absence of state
noise and control inputs; Bk is the control-input matrix; P−k and Pk are the a-priori
and a-posteriori estimation error covariance matrices, respectively; Qk and Rk are
the process noise and measurement noise covariance matrices, respectively; Hk is
the observation matrix, and Kk is the optimal EKF gain. We suppose a stationary
transition model with an identity matrix Ak = I2 for each time instant k, which is
equivalent of assuming a fixed interferer location. Furthermore, no controlled input
signals are considered in the system, B = 0. As far as observations are concerned,
the nonlinear relation connecting measurements and the state vector is given by:
hDi,k(xk) =
√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2 (1.8)
The observation model HDk of size 2×M is described by the Jacobian matrix of hDi,k:
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HDk =

− X1−Xk√
(X1−Xk)2+(Y1−Yk)2
− Y1−Yk√
(X1−Xk)2+(Y1−Yk)2
...
...
− XM−Xk√
(XM−Xk)2+(YM−Yk)2
− YM−Yk√
(XM−Xk)2+(YM−Yk)2
 (1.9)
The fundamental idea of this algorithm comes from the intuition that the ob-
servables yi match this model if and only if an interfering signal is detected. On
the contrary, if no interference is recognized, the EKF is not optimal and thus does
not provide a minimum mean square error (MMSE) solution to the state estimation
problem. More information on EKF observability can be found in §A.1.2.
Let us now consider the eigenvalues of the estimation error covariance matrix Pk:
its largest eigenvalue corresponds to the least observable linear combination of state
components (Xk, Yk). Therefore, the maximum eigenvalue of Pk measures the degree
of observability of the EKF. Based on this remark, we can define a discriminating
function as the maximum eigenvalue of Pk:
D(Pk) = max
i=1,2
{λi} (1.10)
Whenever the discriminating function takes low values, the system is characterized
by high observability, indicating the presence of a jammer. As a consequence, we can
define a threshold ξe for an aggregate decision test on the aforementioned hypothesis
based on measurements collected from all the nodes:
D(P)
Hˆ0
≷
Hˆ1
ξe (1.11)
where Hˆ0 is chosen if the discriminating function is above the threshold and Hˆ1 is
chosen otherwise. An example of discriminating function is shown in Figure 1.3.
The figure shows the behaviour of the discriminating function over time for different
values of average SNR at the nodes: the jammer starts transmitting at tJ = 500 and
the discriminating function clearly falls in correspondence of this instant.
1.3.3 Jammer localization
Once an interference source is detected, a second EKF is initialized to estimate its
position. This localization filter differs from the detection EKF in the observation
model only. At this stage, we want to obtain a precise estimate of the jammer
location through a more accurate distance evaluation. This is done by estimating
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Figure 1.3: Example of O-JJDL discriminating function
also the interfering signal transmit power Pt in eq. (1.4a). Thus the unknown state
vector has an additional component and becomes x = (Xk, Yk, Pt) In this case, the
nonlinear observation function is:
hLi,k =
√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2√
Pt
(1.12)
The partial derivatives of this function and the observation model are given by:
∂hLi,k
∂Xk
=− Xi −Xk√
[(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2]Pt
(1.13)
∂hLi,k
∂Yk
=− Yi − Yk√
[(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2]Pt
(1.14)
∂hLi,k
∂Pt
=−
√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
2
√
P 3t
(1.15)
Hlk =

∂hL1,k
∂Xk
∂hL1,k
∂Yk
∂hL1,k
∂Pt
...
...
...
∂hLM,k
∂Xk
∂hLM,k
∂Yk
∂hLM,k
∂Pt

(1.16)
A diagram of the complete algorithm with both detection and localization filters is
represented in Figure 1.4. Although the initial concept of the O-JJDL algorithm
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Figure 1.4: O-JJDL block diagram
comes from an original and interesting idea, the algorithm presents a few drawbacks
that make its use difficult:
1. Dependence of the discriminating function on the scenario;
2. Dependence of the discriminating function on Rk and Qk;
3. Necessity two EKF;
4. No a-priori information on detection performance.
The I-JJDL algorithm is an evolution of the original algorithm, overcomes these
drawbacks and it is more suitable for real-life applications.
1.4 Innovation-driven JJDL algorithm
The I-JJDL algorithm consists of three main phases:
(i) Observables estimation;
(ii) Jammer position tracking;
(iii) Jammer detection.
In step (i), the observables are estimated from the received signal; in step (ii) the FC
estimates the current position (and velocity) of the potential jammer with an EKF;
in step (iii) the FC takes a decision on the presence or absence of a jammer, based
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on the FC behaviour. Here two versions of the I-JJDL algorithm are presented: the
first version employs power-based observables, while the second one makes use of
TDOA and frequency difference of arrival (FDOA) measurements [P3]. Step (iii) is
identical in both algorithms, while steps (i-ii) depend on the kind of observables.
It is wort mentioning that the algorithm can be adapted to cope with different
kinds of observables, as long as they are a function of the relative distance/velocity
of the jammer.
1.5 Observables estimation
1.5.1 Power-based I-JJDL algorithm
In the power-based I-JJDL algorithm, the nodes estimate the received power from the
incoming signal. In order to do so, the following assumptions are made. The jamming
signal is assumed to have narrower bandwidth than that of the receivers equipping
the sensor nodes, and a constant power. Clearly, the relationship between received
power, transmit power, and distance is in general a complex function of propagation
characteristics. These are in turn dependent on the selected environment. In order
to show a solution which is both simple and agnostic, we assume a classic exponential
path loss model with parameter α, which can be fit to the environment. With the
aforementioned assumptions, the power received by the i-th node can be expressed
as:
Pr,i =

PN,i, if H0 holds (1.17a)
Pt
(
c
4pifcdi
)α
+ PN,i, if H1 holds (1.17b)
where PN,i is the noise power, Pt is the jammer transmit power, and c is light velocity
in vacuum. The received signal is then discretized as in eq. (1.3a-1.3b).
Using an observation window with N samples, nodes estimate the received power
through the following estimator [P1]:
Pr,i,k ≈ T (ri,k) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
|ri,k [n]|2 (1.18)
which averages the square magnitude of N samples of the incoming signal. This
operation is performed for every epoch k of the EKF execution. The equation relating
the estimated received power to the distance between the jammer and the i-th node
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depends on the transmit power Pt, as expressed in:
di,k =
c
4pifc
α
√
Pt
T (ri,k)− PN (1.19)
However, the problem of retrieving the distance from the received power is undeter-
mined when the transmit power is unknown. For this reason, we introduce a new
observable called distance per unit of transmit power that is measured in meter per
Watt:
yi,k =
c
4pifc
α
√
1
T (ri,k)− PN (1.20)
The nodes compute these observables, which are then sent to the FC and collected
in the vector yk ∈ RM . The ambiguity related to Pt will be solved by the EKF.
1.5.2 TDOA/FDOA-based I-JJDL algorithm
This version of the algorithm exploits TDOA and FDOA measurements instead of
received power. Although the processing of these kind of observables is more cum-
bersome and strict synchronization of sensing nodes is required, TDOA and FDOA
provide a more robust and accurate alternative to power-based measurements. More-
over, as suggested in [P6] and §3, synchronization of low-cost software-defined radio
(SDR) is today possible and affordable.
TDOA is defined as the difference in time between the reception of a signal
by different nodes. FDOA is the differential Doppler between different nodes. In
TDOA /TDOA localization, one of the M sensing nodes is designated as reference
node (i = r). Observables will be estimated with respect to the reference node only,
as:
TDOAi = TOAr − TOAi (1.21)
FDOAI = FOAr − FOAi (1.22)
where TDOA is the difference of time of arrivals and FDOA is the difference of
frequency of arrivals. In the presence ofM nodes, the number of linearly independent
TDOA or FDOA observables is M − 1. Each node records the raw samples of the
received signal and sends them to the FC which is in charge of estimating the M − 1
TDOA/FDOA observables. The observable estimation phase of the I-JJDL, unlike
the power-based case, is performed by the FC. TDOA and FDOA measurements are
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obtained from the signals thanks to the processing of the complex ambiguity function
(CAF), defined as [33]:
χi (τ, k) =
N−1∑
n=0
sr (n) s
∗
i (τ + n) e
−j2pi kn
N (1.23)
where sr and si are the digital signals received by node r and i, respectively; τ is the
lag, k is the digital Doppler frequency, and N is the number of signal samples used
for the computation of the CAF. The expression of the CAF can be rewritten in a
more computationally efficient way as:
χi (τ, k) = DFT {sr (n) s∗i (τ + n)} (1.24)
The TDOA and FDOA measurements are obtained by finding the maximum point
of the CAF’s magnitude in the lag-doppler domain.(
̂TDOAi, ̂FDOAi
)
= argmax
τ,k
{|χi (τ, k)|} (1.25)
Once the observables are obtained, they are used in the next step of the algorithm
for tracking the position and velocity of a potential jammer.
1.6 Jammer position tracking
The task of this phase is to estimate the position of the potential jammer by running
the EKF with the observables collected in the previous step. As introduced in [34],
the optimal EKF can be described by equations (1.26a)–(1.26b) and (1.27a)–(1.27c),
where xˆ−k and xˆk are the a-priori and a-posteriori state estimates, respectively; Ak
is the state transition matrix describing the evolution of the system in absence of
state noise and control inputs; Bk is the control-input matrix; P−k and Pk are the
a-priori and a-posteriori estimation error covariance matrices, respectively; Qk and
Rk are the process noise and measurement noise covariance matrices, respectively;
Hk is the observation matrix, and Kk is the optimal EKF gain (§A.1).{
xˆ−k = Akxˆk−1 + Bkuk (1.26a)
P−k = AkPk−1A
T
k + Qk (1.26b)
Kk = P
−
k H
T
k
(
HkP
−
k H
T
k + Rk
)−1 (1.27a)
xˆk = xˆ
−
k + Kk
(
yk −Hkxˆ−k
)
(1.27b)
Pk = P
−
k −KkHkP−k (1.27c)
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1.6.1 Power-based algorithm
In the power-based case, the state vector to be estimated is xk =
(
Xk, Yk, α
√
Pt,k
)
.
The use of α
√
Pt,k in place of Pt,k simplifies the EKF equations and improves the
filter convergence properties. The equation describing the dependence of the state
vector on the i-th observable is the following nonlinear function:
hi.k (xk) =
√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
α
√
Pt,k
, (1.28)
Therefore, the whole observation model is described by the function hk : R3 → RM
defined as hk = (h1,k, h2,k, . . . , hM,k)T . The observation matrix is obtained from
(1.28) by linearization (eq. (1.29)–(1.32)).
Hk =J hk =

∂h1,k
∂Xk
∂h1,k
∂Yk
∂h1,k
∂
√
Pt,k
∂h2,k
∂Xk
∂h2,k
∂Yk
∂h2,k
∂
√
Pt,k
...
...
...
∂hM,k
∂Xk
∂hM,k
∂Yk
∂hM,k
∂
√
Pt,k

(1.29)
∂hi,k
∂Xk
=− Xi −Xk√[
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
]
α
√
Pt,k
(1.30)
∂hi,k
∂Yk
=− Yi − Yk√[
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
]
α
√
Pt,k
(1.31)
∂hi,k
∂
√
Pt,k
=−
√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
α
√
P 2t,k
(1.32)
The determination of the optimal Qk and Rk is beyond the scope of this dissertation,
but the interested reader can refer to [34], [35], and [36]. Pragmatically, it is
reasonable to assume the components of the process noise and the measurement noise
from different nodes as uncorrelated. This translates into diagonal noise covariance
matrices and, we can set these matrices as:{
Qk = σQI3 ∀k (1.33a)
Rk = σRIM ∀k (1.33b)
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Figure 1.5: Power-based algorithm block diagram
As far as the a-priori model is concerned, the jammer can be assumed to be quasi
static. This assumption can be shown to hold in most application scenarios, given
the coherence time involved by typical dynamic settings. Since the jamming power
is constant, the state transition matrix Ak is an identity matrix. The absence of
controlled inputs translates into a null Bk matrix.
Ak = I3, ∀k (1.34a)
Bk = 0, ∀k (1.34b)
xˆ−k = Akxˆk−1 (1.34c)
It is worth noticing that the EKF estimates a state vector regardless of the actual
presence of a jammer. Indeed, this forms the basis for the detection phase.The
algorithm is summarized by the block diagram in Figure 1.5.
1.6.2 TDOA/FDOA-based algorithm
In the TDOA/FDOA version of the TDOA algorithm, the unknown system state to
be estimated, includes the position and velocity of the jammer along the X and Y
axes.
xk = (Xk, Yk, Vx,k, Vy,k) (1.35)
For TDOA measurements, equation 1.28 relating observables to the system state,
becomes
hTDOAi,k (xk, ) =
√
(Xr −Xk)2 + (Yr − Yk)2
c
−
√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
c
(1.36)
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For FDOA, instead eq. 1.28 becomes
hFDOAi,k (xk) =
=
fc
c
〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)〉
‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)‖ −
fc
c
〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)〉
‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)‖
(1.37)
where ‖·‖ and 〈·, ·〉 indicate the Euclidean norm and the dot product, respectively.
The observation model, in this case, is described by the function hk : R4 → R2M−2
defined as hk =
(
hTDOA1,k , . . . , h
TDOA
M−1,k, h
FDOA
1,k . . . , h
FDOA
M−1,k
)T
, and the observation
matrix of equations (1.38)-(1.44) is the Jacobian matrix of the observation model.
Hk = J hk =

∂hTDOA1,k
∂Xk
∂hTDOA1,k
∂Yk
0 0
...
...
...
...
∂hTDOAM−1,k
∂Xk
∂hTDOAM−1,k
∂Yk
0 0
∂hFDOA1,k
∂Xk
∂hFDOA1,k
∂Yk
∂hFDOA1,k
∂Vx,k
∂hFDOA1,k
∂Vy,k
...
...
...
...
∂hFDOAM−1,k
∂Xk
∂hFDOAM−1,k
∂Yk
∂hFDOAM−1,k
∂Vx,k
∂hFDOAM−1,k
∂Vy,k

(1.38)
∂hTDOAi,k
∂Xk
=
1
c
Xk −Xr√
(Xr −Xk)2 + (Yr − Yk)2
− 1
c
Xk −Xi√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
(1.39)
∂hTDOAi,k
∂Yk
=
1
c
Yk − Yr√
(Xr −Xk)2 + (Yr − Yk)2
− 1
c
Yk − Yi√
(Xi −Xk)2 + (Yi − Yk)2
(1.40)
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∂hFDOAi,k
∂Xk
=− fc
c
(Yk − Yr) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)〉√
‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)‖3
+
fc
c
(Yk − Yi) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)〉√
‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)‖3
(1.41)
∂hFDOAi,k
∂Yk
= +
fc
c
(Xk −Xr) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)〉√
‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)‖3
− fc
c
(Xk −Xi) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)〉√
‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)‖3
(1.42)
∂hFDOAi,k
∂Vx,k
= +
fc
c
(Xk −Xr) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)〉‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)‖
− fc
c
(Xk −Xi) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)〉‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)‖ (1.43)
∂hFDOAi,k
∂Vy,k
= +
fc
c
(Yk − Yr) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)〉‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xr, Yr)‖
− fc
c
(Yk − Yi) 〈(Vx,k, Vy,k) , (Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)〉‖(Xk, Yk)− (Xi, Yi)‖ (1.44)
The a-priori model, in this case, assumes the jammer is moving with a constant
velocity.
ak =

Xk+1 = Xk + Vx,kdt ∀k (1.45a)
Yk+1 = Yk + Vy,kdt ∀k (1.45b)
Vx,k+1 = Vx,k ∀k (1.45c)
Vy,k+1 = Vy,k ∀k (1.45d)
where dt is the time interval between two consecutive EKF iterations, in seconds.
The state transition matrix Ak is the Jacobian matrix of ak:
Ak = J ak =

1 0 dt 0
0 1 0 dt
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 (1.46)
Controlled inputs are absent and Bk = 0 ∀k. The same considerations for the
measurement and noise covariance matrices in the power-based case, hold also in
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Figure 1.6: TDOA/FDOA-based algorithm block diagram
this context. Allowing different measurement error variances for TDOA and FDOA
the covariance matrices are:
Qk = σQI4 ∀k (1.47a)
Rk = diag
σ2TDOA, . . . , σ2TDOA︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1
, σ2FDOA, . . . , σ
2
FDOA︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1
 ∀k (1.47b)
The optimal values for σTDOA and σFDOA can be set according to §A.3.
The complete algorithm is summarized by the block diagram in Figure 1.6.
1.7 Jammer detection
At this step, the task is to take a decision about the presence or absence of inter-
ference, based on the output error of the EKF. More specifically, we monitor the
innovation of the filter, which is the difference between the actual observables and
the measurements predicted using the a-priori state estimate and the observation
model. The innovation vector εk ∈ RM is defined as:
εk = yk −Hkxˆ−k (1.48)
Let F0(x) be the cumulative density function (CDF) of the squared magnitude of
the innovation, in the absence of jamming attempts. This function can be accurately
estimated by initially running the algorithm in a controlled interference-free scenario.
F0(x) = Prob
{
‖εk‖2 ≤ x
}
(1.49)
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Let FND(x) be the empirical CDF of the squared magnitude of the innovation, es-
timated using the last ND samples (εk−Nd+1, . . . , εk). If i = k − ND + 1, then the
empirical CDF is expressed as:
FND (x) =
1
ND
i+Nd−1∑
n=i
1
(
‖εn‖2 ≤ x
)
(1.50)
where 1 (·) is the indicator function, defined as
1 (Zi ≤ x) =
{
1 if Zi ≤ x (1.51a)
0 otherwise (1.51b)
Now it is possible to introduce the decision statistics which yield the main proper-
ties and benefits of the proposed algorithm. Once the empirical CDF is available,
it is compared with that computed in the absence of jammers by means of the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KST):
DND (d) = sup |FND (x)− F0 (x)|
Hˆ1
≷
Hˆ0
d (1.52)
The KST compares the supremum of the difference between the empirical distribution
and the distribution of the innovation in the absence of jammer, with a threshold d.
The algorithm decides in favour of Hˆ1 whenever the test statistics DND exceeds the
threshold; it decides in favour of Hˆ0 if the test statistics is below the threshold. The
desirable property of the KST is that its test statistics do not depend on F0. In fact,
it depends only on the number ND of samples used in the empirical CDF estimation
and on the test threshold d. Once these two parameters are set, the false-alarm
probability is constant. This probability is defined as that of the test statistics to
exceed the threshold, given that H0 is true:
Pfa = Prob {DND > d | H0} (1.53)
Although no closed form of the false-alarm probability exists, Marsaglia et al. [37]
proposed an algorithm to compute this probability. This algorithm becomes more
and more accurate by increasing the product d
√
ND and reaches accuracies com-
parable to the machine precision. Figure 1.7 shows the theoretical false alarm
probability as a function of the number of samples for estimating the empirical CDF
and the KST threshold.
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Figure 1.7: Theoretical probability of false alarm from eq. (1.53)
1.8 Numerical results
In our reference scenario, used for performance evaluation, we consider a square SA
of size l × l. By selecting the bottom-left corner of this region as the origin of the
axes, we arrange the nodes in a grid with coordinates given by the Cartesian product
of the following linearly-spaced sets:0, . . . , l︸ ︷︷ ︸√
M
×
0, . . . , l︸ ︷︷ ︸√
M
 , √M ∈ N>0, (1.54)
which results in the node deployment of Figure 1.8. Note that the algorithm perfor-
mance does not depend critically on regularity, but on achieving sufficiently small
dilution of precisions. The experiment starts in the absence of interference. At
the time instant tJ , a jammer starts to transmit a chirp signal from a random and
unknown position within the SA and keeps transmitting until the experiment ends at
instant tN . In the TDOA/FDOA-based algorithm, the jammer moves with constant
velocity, towards a random direction. The performance of the algorithm is evalu-
ated with Monte Carlo simulations. Simulation parameters are collected in Tables
1.1-1.2. Jammer detection capabilities are evaluated in terms of false-alarm rate
(Pˆfa), missed-detection rate (Pˆmd), and detection delay (δˆ). For the localization,
the chosen metrics are the root mean square position (and velocity) error (R̂MSE
and ̂RMSEV )). False-alarm (missed-detection) rate is measured as the ratio be-
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Table 1.1: Simulation parameters (power-based algorithm)
Symbol Description Value
Tc Chirp period 50µs
Bc Chirp bandwidth 5 MHz
α Path loss exponent 2
Pt Jammer transmit power -20 dBW
fc Jammer carrier frequency 1575.42 MHz
Br Node receiver bandwidth 10 MHz
Rs Node receiver sampling rate 20 Msps
PN Node receiver noise power -127 dBW
σQ EKF process noise standard deviation 10−6
σR EKF measurement noise standard deviation 1
N Number of samples used for power estimation 100
tN Experiment duration (EKF iterations) 20000
tj Jammer starting instant (EKF iterations) 10000
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Table 1.2: Simulation parameters (TDOA/FDOA-based algorithm)
Symbol Description Value
Tc Chirp period 50µs
Bc Chirp bandwidth 5 MHz
α Path loss exponent 2
Pt Jammer transmit power -20 dBW
fc Jammer carrier frequency 1575.42 MHz
Br Node receiver bandwidth 10 MHz
Rs Node receiver sampling rate 20 Msps
PN Node receiver noise power -127 dBW
σQ EKF process noise standard deviation 10−6
σR EKF measurement noise standard deviation 1
N CAF observation interval 1 ms
V Jammer velocity 50 km/h
tN Experiment duration (EKF iterations) 20000
tj Jammer starting instant (EKF iterations) 10000
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Figure 1.8: Node positions in the service area
tween the number of false-alarm (missed-detection) events over the total number of
experiments, as indicated in (1.55-1.56)
Pˆfa =
#false alarm events
#experiments
≈ Prob
{
Hˆ1 | H0
}
(1.55)
Pˆmd =
#missed detection events
#experiments
≈ Prob
{
Hˆ0 | H1
}
(1.56)
The detection delay is the time difference between the instant when interference
(tˆJ) is detected and the actual instant when the jammer starts transmitting (tJ),
measured in EKF epochs, as follows:
δˆ = tˆJ − tJ (1.57)
Both R̂MSE and ̂RMSEV are measured only when the jammer is transmitting, as
displayed according to the following expression:
R̂MSE =
√√√√ tN∑
k=tJ
‖X − Xˆk, Y − Yˆk‖2
tN − tJ (1.58)
̂RMSEV =
√√√√ tN∑
k=tJ
‖Vx − Xˆx,k, Vy − Yˆy,k‖2
tN − tJ (1.59)
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Figure 1.9: Error between theoretical false-alarm probability and measured false-
alarm rate
Detection results are valid for both versions of the algorithm. On the contrary
localization results are shown separately for the power-based and TDOA/FDOA-
based algorithms.
1.8.1 Detection performance
The first significant result worth analyzing is the behavior of the false-alarm rate
compared to the corresponding theoretical probability. Figure 1.9 shows the error be-
tween the theoretical false-alarm probability and the measured rate (|Pˆfa−Pfa|/Pfa)
as a function of the KST threshold d, by varying the number of nodes M and the
number ND of innovation samples used for the CDF estimation. From the figure,
we may notice that for increasing ND and d, the error decreases, as indeed suggested
in [37]. The maximum error of 32% is obtained for d = 0.1 and ND = 100 and it
is located in a region where the false-alarm probability is too high (of the order of
0.1) to be of practical interest (see Figure 1.7). In the region of practical interest
(Pfa < 10−3), the error falls rapidly below 1%. Moreover, the fact that the error does
not depend significantly on the number of sensor nodes M is remarkable. In fact,
as highlighted before, false-alarm probability essentially depends on ND and d. This
property is very important, as it possibly allows for designing a jammer-detecting
network of nodes with CFAR characteristics, by selecting the appropriate values of
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ND and d.
Regarding missed detection probability, due to the intrinsic characteristics of the
decision metric, it presents a step-wise behaviour for growing values of the threshold,
so that it is null for all practical means, as shown in Fig. 1.10. About the accuracy of
Figures 1.9-1.10, the curves have been obtain by repeating the reference experiment
until 1000 false-alarms/missed-detection events occurred with the maximum number
of iterations set to 10000. The final result is the average of these multiple realizations
The choice of ND and d has an obvious impact on the detection delay. Figure
1.11 shows this dependence. However, since practical applications can often tolerate
delays up to seconds, ND and d are not critical design parameter, as far as delay is
concerned. Moreover, the delay is fairly linear with the KST threshold, and the
slope of the lines is exactly ND. As a consequence, the delay can be described by
(1.60).
δ = δ0 +Ndd (1.60)
1.8.2 Localization performance
The localization performance of the power-based algorithm is compared with the
square root of the Cramér-Rao lower bound (SR-CRB) (§A.3). Figure 1.12 shows
the RMSE as a function of the number of nodes. The localization RMSE is limited
to 0.2m with M = 4 and approaches the SR-CRB by increasing the number of
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Figure 1.13: Localization root mean square error (TDOA/FDOA-based algorithm)
monitoring nodes.
One may argue that the algorithm has not been tested in a dynamic scenario
with a moving jammer, which is a quite usual situation. Actually, the velocity of
the jammer does not compromise the performance of the algorithm. Indeed, in this
case, the only problem that may rise is the underestimation of the received power
caused by the Doppler shift, which could shift part of the signal spectrum outside
of the receiver band. However, in order for this to happen, the frequency shift has
to be dramatic, in the order of hundreds of kHz, which corresponds to to unrealistic
speeds.
In the TDOA/FDOA-based version of the algorithm, we compare R̂MSE and
̂RMSEV with the lower bounds in Figures 1.13-1.14. We obtain similar results to
the power-based case, but we are able to estimate the jammer velocity as well.
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Figure 1.14: Velocity estimation root mean square error (TDOA/FDOA-based algo-
rithm)
1.9 TDOA/FDOA-based I-JJDL on low-cost SDR
As a proof of concept, this section describes the implementation of the TDOA/FDOA-
based I-JJDL algorithm using low-cost SDR. The experiment has been carried out
in the RF System and Payload laboratory, ESTEC (Figure 1.15) . A diagram of the
test setup is shown in Figure 1.16. The jammer is emulated using a HackRF (see
§XX), which transmits a chirp signal with a band of 20MHz, a chirp period of 50 us,
and a transmit power of 1 mW. The interfering signal is fed to a RF power divider
and then to a SPIRENT VR5 HD Spatial Channel Emulator. The SPIRENT VR5
emulates the scenario in Figure 1.17.
Four HackRF have been used to emulate the four sensor nodes. Each HackRF
is synchronized in frequency using a high accuracy clock. The time synchronization
is provided thanks to two mass market GNSS receivers. The sampling frequency
of the sensor node is 10 MHz, the receiver bandwidth is 5 MHz, and the CAF
integration interval is 1 ms. The experiment has been repeated 1000 times and, for
each realization each node records 200 ms. The jammer starts transmitting at a
random instant within this 200ms interval. The signals have been processed using
the TDOA/FDOA-based algorithm described in the present chapter.
Figure 1.18 shows the probability density function (PDF) of the localization error.
The localization error is limited to 25 m, and the mode is 4 m. This error is the effect
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Figure 1.15: Laboratory setup
Figure 1.16: Diagram of the test setup
1.9 TDOA/FDOA-based I-JJDL on low-cost SDR 43
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
0
200
400
600
800
1000
X [m]
Y 
[m
]
 
 Jammer position
Estimated jammer position
Nodes
Figure 1.17: Emulated test scenario
0 10 20 30 40 500
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
RMSE [m]
PD
F
Figure 1.18: Experimental root mean square localization error
44 Joint Interference Detection and Localization
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
RMSEV [m/s]
PD
F
Figure 1.19: Experimental root mean square velocity estimation error
of the residual synchronization error (100 ns) on the TDOA estimation. Although
the residual synchronization error introduces a bias in the EKF observables (30 m),
the algorithm is still able to provide a sufficient accuracy for the jammer localization
application.
Figure 1.19 shows the probability density function (PDF) of the velocity esti-
mation error. This error is limited to 3 m/s and the mode is below 1 m/s. The
velocity estimation shows a better accuracy because all the sensor nodes share the
same clock.
Chapter2
Interference Mitigation
In this chapter, we consider two possible approaches to the interference mitigation
problem. The first approach is described by the distributed-sensing waveform esti-
mation (DSWE) algorithm which allows for interference cancellation in time domain,
thanks to cooperative multi-node interfering waveform estimation [P8].
The second approach does not involve interference cancellation, but achieves in-
terference mitigation thanks to integration of GNSS and inertial navigation system
(INS). Notwithstanding this method has been devised in order to improve the track-
ing accuracy in racing vehicles, it can be successfully applied in order to improve
reliability, accuracy and availability of the position solution in interfered scenarios
[P5].
2.1 Distributed-sensing waveform estimation
Several techniques have been proposed for wide-band interference characterization
and mitigation. Traditional time-domain interference mitigation technique, such
as pulse blanking are ineffective against chirp jammers [38]. The most promising
techniques are the transformed-domain ones. Borio et al. proposed time-frequency
analysis for interference excision [16]; Wavelet transform has been used for the same
purpose in [39]; The first attempts at using Karhunen-Loève transform for interfer-
ence mitigation appeared in [40] and [41]. However, none of the aforementioned
techniques exploits the cooperation of multiple users for interference characterization
and mitigation.
Here, we present the DSWE algorithm based on Karhunen-Loève expansion
(KLE). Karhunen-Loève Expansion (§A.4) (sometimes denoted as Karhunen-Loève
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Transform or Principal Component Analysis) allows to represent a signal, in the
proper vector space, such that noise and redundancy are removed. As an intuitive
example, it is possible to consider an object that is moving on a straight line in a
three-dimensional Euclidean space. Suppose three cameras, one for each orthogonal
Cartesian direction, are observing the experiment. It is intuitive stating that the
best representation of the object’s trajectory would be the one recorded by the cam-
era which is orthogonal to the straight line on which the object is moving: even if
the object’s motion takes place in a three-dimensional space, we are interested just
in what happens in a single direction, all the information is contained in a single
direction. Even if there is no camera in the privileged direction, by combining in
the appropriate way the contributions of the three cameras, it is always possible
to represent the trajectory in a single direction. In a similar way, we apply this
idea to waveform estimation. The proposed algorithm, applied to interfering signals,
provides accurate waveform estimates suitable for interference cancellation. More-
over, the estimation algorithm is robust against channel model mismatch and offers
superior performance, even in the presence of very low SNR.
After waveform estimation, each node is able to cancel the effect of interference,
by coherently subtracting the disturbing signal, after frequency and phase estimation
(obtainable using traditional non data aided estimation). Notwithstanding the algo-
rithm has been tested on chirp signals, it is meant to be applied to any wide-sense
stationary signal, that is basically most of modulated signals.
2.1.1 System model
We consider a network of M waveform estimating nodes placed on a grid, as shown
in 2.1. We refer to the region occupied by nodes as service area.
Assume that a jammer is transmitting an interfering signal within the service
area. The network of nodes, by exploiting the structure of the jamming signal,
must provide an estimate of the interfering signal waveform, suitable for interference
cancellation.
2.1.2 Algorithm description
The DSWE algorithm exploits the structure of interfering signal in order to charac-
terize them. The waveform estimation algorithm is composed by three main phases:
(i) Period estimation
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Figure 2.1: Grid of waveform estimating nodes
(ii) Averaging
(iii) Interfering signal reconstruction
The first two steps are performed by nodes, while the third one is performed by a
FC, which collects the data from nodes. In the following it is assumed that each
node records the received interfering signals in an observation interval TO, with a
sampling frequency fs.
Period estimation
The objective of the first step is to provide an estimate of the duration of the in-
terfering signal period: this is obtained thanks to the autocorrelation properties of
the signal. The autocorrelation function of the interfering signal is periodic and its
repetition period is equal to the period of z(t). Figure 2.2 shows a block diagram
of the period estimation algorithm. Firstly, the autocorrelation function of the
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Figure 2.2: Block diagram of the period estimation phase
interfering signal is estimated:
Rˆk(m) =

1√
Rˆk(0)
N−m−1∑
n=0
s∗r,k(n+m)sr,k(n) m ≥ 0 (2.1a)
Rˆk(−m) m < 0 (2.1b)
After the autocorrelation is estimated, the correlation peaks are found by comparing
the modulus of Rˆk with a threshold γ, then the distance between any two consecutive
peaks is computed and the most probable distance is selected as the estimated period
Tˆj,k, where k indicates the k-th node. Once the firts node has estimated the period,
the value of Tˆj is broadcast to all the nodes.
Averaging
In the second step, the average waveform in a period is computed:
s¯r,k =
1
bNs/Tˆjc
bNs/Tˆjc∑
n=1
sr,k
(
t− nTˆj
)
e−jφˆn (2.2)
where Ns is the number of samples per observation interval Ns = TOfs. In order
to average out noise and boost the SNR, it is important to sum coherently the
samples of the recorded waveform. To this aim, an open loop phase estimator is
used, allowing the correction of the waveform’s phase φn. Moreover, the expected
value of the waveform is removed, in order to simplify the equations in the following
steps, without loss of generality. The operations performed by each node in phase
(ii) are depicted in Figure 2.3.
2.1.3 Interference signal reconstruction
The averaged samples of the interfering signal waveform s¯r,k, k = 1, . . . ,M are sent
to the FC, which aims to reconstruct the transmitted modulating signal waveform
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Figure 2.4: Fusion center block diagram
z(t), using KLE (§A.4). First, the averaged samples of the signal waveform recorded
by nodes, are collected in the matrix Sr ∈MM×Ns(R), then the signal autocovariance
matrix Cs ∈MNs(R) is estimated by:
Cs = SrS
H
r (2.3)
where (·)H is the Hermitian operator. The eigenvalues λ = (λ1, . . . , λNs)T ∈ CNs
and the corresponding eigenvectors η ∈ MNs(C), are computed by diagonalization
of the matrix Cs. Then the KLE coefficients are obtained by projecting the signal
space onto the eigenvector space:
y = SHr · η (2.4)
and the eigenvalue with maximum magnitude is determined
λ¯max = max
n=1,...,Ns
{λn} (2.5)
The interfering signal modulating waveform samples Sˆ0, are reconstructed using the
eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue with maximum amplitude only:
Sˆ0 = ynη
H
n (2.6)
thus, reducing the number of dimensions of the signal space to 1. By tracking the
received signal frequency and phase, it is possible to subtract the interfering signal
waveform from the received signal in time domain. The interference reconstruction
phase is summarized in Figure 2.4
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Table 2.1: Simulation parameters (Distributed-sensing waveform estimation algo-
rithm
Symbol Description Value
Pt Jammer transmit power 20 dBm
α Path-loss exponent 3
fd Maximum Doppler frequency 600 Hz
N0 AWGN power spectral density -196 dBW/Hz
B Receiver bandwidth 5 MHz
fs Sampling frequency 16 MHz
fc Jamming signal carrier frequency 1575.42 MHz
 Maximum tolerated MSE 0.5
2.1.4 Numerical results
In order to evaluate the algorithm performance, we used Monte-Carlo simulations.
Before commenting the simulations results, we define a waveform estimation success
probability PS as the probability of a correct period and waveform estimation, that
is the probability that at least one node is able to estimate the period and the mean
square error (MSE) between the transmitted interfering waveform and the estimated
one is below the maximum tolerated MSE, :
PS = Prob
{∣∣∣Tˆj,k − Tj∣∣∣ < 1
fs
∧MSE[Sˆ0,S0] < 
}
(2.7)
MSE, in the following, is computed on normalized signals. In order to evaluate the
success probability, we used a network ofM nodes, as shown in Figure 2.1, placed on
a 1 km × 1 km square region. The jamming source position is randomly chosen with
uniform distribution within the service area and an estimate of the interfering signal
waveform is obtained thanks to the algorithm described in the previous section.
The results presented in the remainder of this section are obtained by averaging
ten thousands repetition of the same experiment, in order to have statistically valid
results. Simulation parameters are summarized in Table 2.1. A generic node k
receives the interfering signal transmitted by the jammer through a time-varying
flat-fading channel, with impulse response h. The signal received by the k−th node
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Figure 2.5: Waveform estimation success probability (AWGN)
can be written as
sr,k(t) = s(t) ∗ h(t, τ) (2.8)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator. Assuming two-dimensional isotropic scat-
tering and vertical monopole antennas at the nodes, the PSD fo the received fading
signal can be modelled as in [42]:
S(f) =

1
pifd
√
1−
(
f
fd
)2 |f | < fd (2.9a)
0 elsewhere (2.9b)
In order to understand the impact of a dynamic channel on performance, we
tested the algorithm both in static and dynamic channel conditions: the reference
algorithm performance is obtained in AWGN. With this simple model, the received
signal is an attenuated and delayed version of the transmitted one:
sr,k(t) = s(t− τk)
√
K
dαk
(2.10)
where dk is the distance between the k-th node and the jamming source, α is the
path-loss exponent and K is the path-loss at the reference distance. The perfor-
mance in AWGN, are shown in Figures 2.5-2.6 Figure 2.5 shows the waveform
estimation success probability dependence on the ratio between period and obser-
vation interval duration Tj/TO , for different network dimensions M . The success
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Figure 2.6: mean squared error between transmitted and estimated waveforms
(AWGN)
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Figure 2.7: Waveform estimation success probability (dynamic channel)
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Figure 2.8: mean squared error between transmitted and estimated waveforms (dy-
namic channel)
probability decreases when increasing Tj/TO, and we have PS > 0.8 for M > 9 and
Tj/TO < 3: the observation of just 3 chirp periods is sufficient to obtain very good
performance. For M < 9, we have a lower success probability and we need to record
hundreds of chirp periods to have success probabilities better than 70%. As far as
MSE is concerned, we have outstanding performance, as shown in Figure 2.6: MSE is
always below 0.15. Its behavior is decreasing for decreasing values of Tj/TO and for
increasing size of the network. A saturation effect is present: increasing the network
size beyond M = 9 does not provide enough benefits to justify the higher network
complexity.
Then the algorithm has been tested using the dynamic channel and simulation
results are collected in Figures 2.7-2.8 . The results show a similar behavior for both
channels, with performance degradation in terms of both success probability and
MSE, in the dynamic channel scenario. Thus, we can draw the same conclusions as in
the AWGN case. Figure 2.7 shows the waveform estimation success probability in the
dynamic channel case: for low values of Tj/TO (≤ 1/100) and forM ≥ 16, the success
probability is analogous to the AWGN case but, for increasing value of the ratio
between period duration and observation interval, we have a stronger performance
degradation. For Tj/TO < 1/100, the success probability in the dynamic channel case
is 5-8% worse with respect to the AWGN scenario. Talking about MSE and looking
at Figure 2.8, we notice a stronger performance degradation: while in AWGN, mean
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squared error can be lower than 0.01 forM = 25 and Tj/TO < 1/10, we can not reach
values below 0.08 in the dynamic channel case. Moreover, the curves associated to
different values of M are more distant from each other, meaning that increasing the
network size gives more consistent benefits in the dynamic channel scenario. The
DSWE algorithm improves MSE from values greater than 0.4 to values lower than
0.08. This means that, using our algorithm we can obtain a very low residual after
interference cancellation. Notwithstanding the moderate performance degradation
with respect to the MSE case, the algorithm shows outstanding performance even in
presence of mobility.
2.2 Optimal EKF for Quasi-Tightly Coupled GNSS/INS
Integration
As many emerging automotive applications (e.g. autonomous navigation, dynamic
control, driving assistance, route guidance, etc.) rely on localization services, en-
hanced reliability of vehicles positioning is becoming a crucial constraint. However,
requirements in terms of both accuracy and availability turn out to be challenging
in typical vehicular scenarios. The position solution is indeed potentially subject to
harsh electromagnetic environments (e.g. urban canyons, interference), where rang-
ing signals are hindered or disturbed, and to large dynamics whenever high speeds
occur. With an increasing number of sensors being made available in modern vehi-
cles, large amounts of data can be used to aid in the localization process together
with satellite systems. Because of their complementary features, GGNSS are often
employed together with INS in order to improve the localization reliability [43]. As
well known, the satellites constellation provides unbiased and repeatable position
estimates, which are however available at slow rates and with limited precision. On
the other hand, inertial sensors (such as accelerometers, magnetometers, and gyros)
continuously allow for position updates at high rates, but their inner drift grow pro-
gressively into potentially unbounded errors. With the aim of balancing out these
drawbacks, the received GNSS information is exploited to periodically calibrate the
INS, thus preventing the overall accuracy from degrading with time. As a result,
this fusion effectively increases the average performance of a navigation system over
long periods as well as its robustness to temporary service blockage or outage.
In this section, we present a navigation technique that enables the tracking of ve-
hicles moving at high speeds with limited complexity. In particular, we consider the
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Figure 2.9: Quasi-tight GNSS/INS integration
development of a precise tracking system for Formula Society of Automotive Engi-
neers (SAE) prototypes as our exemplary application. For this purpose, we resort ot
a particular quasi-tight GNSS/INS integration [44] that blends the final positioning
estimate computed by the receiver and several raw measurements collected by an
inertial platform in a closed-loop form. Unlike more complex tight and ultra-tight
couplings [45], this method works with no modification of the GNSS engine, since
it combines given coordinates and sensing data in a single solution, as shown in Fig.
2.9. At the same time, a configuration of this kind can potentially achieve a higher
accuracy than a simpler loose level of integration, which is instead characterized by
a weighted average of two independent solutions. In brief, the system we target is
capable of performing well with moderate complexity in order to be within the reach
of a low-cost implementation. At this regard, we carry out a specific quasi-tight cou-
pling by adopting suitable deterministic description of the model that estimates the
vehicle position in real-time. The mathematical formulation we propose represents
a novel realization of this integration.
An EKF is used to merge GNSS and INS information, as velocities and accel-
erations of the tracked vehicle are described through time-variant relationships that
are nonlinear. Moreover, we address the optimization of the stochastic properties
of the mathematical model underlying the estimation process. The noise covariance
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matrices are indeed tuning parameters of the Kalman filter and their identification
increases the quality of the state estimation. Our goal is therefore to achieve a quasi-
optimal performance of the EKF. For this task, we choose the Bayesian approach
proposed in [46] by P. Matisko and V. Havlena, since it can provide more infor-
mation about the entering noise parameters than other procedures reported in the
literature (e.g. Autocovariance Least Squares [47]). This technique numerically ap-
proximates the probability distributions of noise matrices from output measurements
along an important sampling method. Even though the formulation of the principle
underlying this approach results straightforward, its implementation was once im-
practical due to its demand for high computational power. Nowadays, the processing
requirements of this Bayesian method can be handled even by entry-level devices. In
[46], its computation complexity and time consumption are compared to those given
for Autocovariance Least Squares, highlighting the obtained advantages in terms of
memory saving. Hence, a real-time execution of such a recursive algorithm is then
expected to be already feasible into current GNSS/INS like the proposed quasi-tight
integration.
2.2.1 Deterministic model
The deterministic model we use to describe the motion of the vehicle under test is
based on the following assumptions. First of all, the dynamic physical quantities
identifying the current state (i.e. position, velocity, and acceleration) are related to
a so-called main two-dimensional reference system XY with the Y axis pointing to
the North of a geodetic system east-north-up (ENU), as illustrated in Figure 2.10.
Hence, the vehicle is supposed to move on a flat surface, as the Z axis corresponding to
the Up direction is not taken into account. Such an hypothesis proves to be realistic
as we consider the scenario of a typical Formula SAE racetrack, which usually does
not feature either significant altitude differences or large dimensions. The curvature
of the earth in each point may be consequently neglected. Further, the orientation
of the motion with respect to the main axes is taken into account by defining a
two-dimensional body reference system xbodyybody, which is in-built with the vehicle
and the inertial platform. This has a tangential ybody axis along the trajectory and
a perpendicular xbody axis outgoing from the right side. The instantaneous rotation
angle between Y and ybody is denoted by θ and its measure is available thanks to
the magnetometer on board. Before starting the simulation, when the vehicle is still
stationary, we assume to align the two reference systems through the initial value θ0.
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Figure 2.10: Main and body reference systems
Without loss of generality, we also set the first position coordinates into the origin
of the main reference system and we finally sketch the vehicle size as a point-like
particle. With the goal of testing the situations that may occur in classic Formula
SAE (FSAE) racetracks, we design some basic types of motions for our particle-like
vehicle:
1. straight lines with uniform acceleration;
2. quick turns at constant velocity;
3. circular hairpins at constant velocity;
4. slaloms at constant velocity.
These trajectories can be generated separately or rather be assembled together to
arrange a whole circuit.
The vehicle dynamics are modelled according to the kinematic equations of a
point-like particle motion over time. They are described through several time-varying
interdependent variables: the coordinates (X,Y ) and the ground speed fvGNSS
read from the GNSS receiver with respect to the main reference system and the
velocity magnitude vINS and the acceleration components (axbody , aybody) respectively
measured by a gyroscope and an accelerometer in the body reference system.
Since the task of the Kalman filter is a position reckoning as accurate as possible,
it suitably combines redundant sequential observations to average out the estimate
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errors. For this reason, in addition to the position coordinates of interest, the ac-
tual state vector x includes also four variables related to the axial velocities and
accelerations, which aid the estimation process, since they contain useful positional
information that are extracted through the deterministic model. Hence, according
to a discrete-time formulation, at each k-th iteration the state has six components
that are all related to the main reference system XY :
xk = (Xk, Yk, Vx,k, Vy,k, ax,k, ay,k)
T (2.11)
The a-priori EKF model considers the vehicle as a point moving with constant ac-
celeration:
ak =

Xk−1 + vx,k−1dt+
1
2
ax,k−1dt2 ∀k (2.12a)
Yk−1 + vy,k−1dt+
1
2
ay,k−1dt2 ∀k (2.12b)
vx,k−1 + ax,k−1dt ∀k (2.12c)
vy,k−1 + ay,k−1dt ∀k (2.12d)
ax,k−1 ∀k (2.12e)
ay,k−1 ∀k (2.12f)
Where dt is the time interval between two consecutive EKF iterations. Hence, the
state transition matrix is
Ak = J ak =

1 0 dt 0 12dt
2 0
0 1 0 dt 0 12dt
2
0 0 1 0 dt 0
0 0 0 1 0 dt
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

(2.13)
Controlled inputs are absent and Bk = 0 ∀k. In this case, the equation relating the
system state to the measurements is:
hk =

XGNSS,k
YGNSS,k
VGNSS,k
VINS,k
ax,INS,k
ay,INS,k

=

Xk
Yk√
V 2x,k + V
2
y,k√
V 2x,k + V
2
y,k
ax,k
ay,k

(2.14)
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Therefore, the observation matrix is
Hk = J hk =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0
v2x,k√
v2x,k+v
2
y,k
v2y,k√
v2x,k+v
2
y,k
0 0
0 0
v2x,k√
v2x,k+v
2
y,k
v2y,k√
v2x,k+v
2
y,k
0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

(2.15)
Usually the GNSS solution is available with a lower rate with respect to INS mea-
surements. Therefore, GNSS measurements may quickly become obsolete. In order
to solve this problem, we use the following observation matrix whenever the GNSS
measurements are not up to date:
Hk = J hk =

0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
v2x,k√
v2x,k+v
2
y,k
v2y,k√
v2x,k+v
2
y,k
0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

(2.16)
In other words, whenever the up-to-date GNSS position is available, it is then used
to calibrate the inertial platform. Otherwise the sensing measurements would lead
to wrong estimates after a while, due to their growing biases.
2.2.2 Stochastic model
The stochastic model represents the uncertainties that characterize the dynamic
system. As usual in the reference literature, we consider both the state noise and the
observation noise to be mutually independent to each other and to have multivariate
Gaussian N distributions with zero mean:
p(wk) = N (0; Qk),∀k (2.17)
p(vk) = N (0; Rk), ∀k (2.18)
where Q ∈ M6×6(R) and R ∈ M6×6(R) denote the state and observation noise
covariance matrices respectively. While the matrix Qk is intended to be recursively
optimized by the proposed algorithm, the matrix Rk is instead assumed to be known
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at each time step. Coherently with the definition of Hk for the observation model,
this noise covariance matrix has two alternative formulations. The first definition is
valid whenever the GNSS information are up-to-date:
Rk =
σ2
X
0 0 0 0 0
0 σ2
Y
0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2v
GNSS
0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2v
INS
0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2axbody
0
0 0 0 0 0 σ2aybody

(2.19)
On the contrary, the following expression is built so that the Kalman filter relies
more on the other measurements coming from the inertial sensors:
Rk =

Σ 0 0 0 0 0
0 Σ 0 0 0 0
0 0 Σ 0 0 0
0 0 0 σ2v
INS
0 0
0 0 0 0 σ2axbody
0
0 0 0 0 0 σ2aybody

(2.20)
where Σ ∈ R+ indicates an arbitrary large value.
2.2.3 Statistical model optimization
The goal of the following discussion is to ensure that the extended Kalman filter
performance is close to the optimum by getting an insight into the optimal noise
covariance matrices. For this purpose, we recursively compute at every iteration the
matrices Qk and Rk that maximize the probability of observing the current and past
output measurements. The advantage of a recursive algorithm is that it performs
an adaptive filtering, which is necessary if the true noise covariance matrices are
time-varying. In brief, this technique returns the noise covariance matrices that are
characterized by the maximal probability density function (pdf) [46]. Let us define a
likelihood function as the probability distribution of the actual output observed vector
yk conditioned by the previous measured data Yk−1 and by the current matrices Qk
and Rk. Since the entering noise is assumed white and Gaussian as usual, this
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function results a multivariate Gaussian N distribution with the mean vector y¯k and
the covariance matrix Pyk that are predicted for the current output yk:
Yk = {y0,y1, ...,yk} (2.21)
p(yk|Yk−1,Qk,Rk) = N (y¯k; Pyk) = N (yˆk; Pyk) (2.22)
The posterior conditional pdf of Qk and Rk conditioned on the observed data Yk (up
to the current k-th time step) is updated by recursively multiplying the likelihood
function with the prior conditioned pdf, as follows:
p(Qk,Rk|Yk) = p(yk|Y
k−1,Qk,Rk)
p(yk|Yk−1) · p(Qk,Rk|Y
k−1) (2.23)
In other words, the most probable pair of noise covariances matrices is found by
numerically approximating the Bayes formula at every iteration. This approach is
employed in a recursive algorithm that is in order of optimizing the statistical model.
2.2.4 Recursive algorithm
Chosen a suitable parameters vector Ω, we define a set S of state noise covariance
matrices according to the prior knowledge about the stochastic model. The initial
parameters have usually a logarithmic scale to assure a higher density for smaller
covariances. For the sake of simplicity, the matrix Q is parametrized as a multiplier
of the unit matrix:
Ωk = (Ω
1
k,Ω
2
k, ...,Ω
N
k ), N ∈ N (2.24)
Sk = S(Ωk) = {Q(Ωik) = Ωik · I6,∀i},Ωi ∈ R+ (2.25)
As far as the observation noise covariance is concerned, the matrix R is instead fixed
according to Eq (2.19) and (2.20), because we assume to know the exact measure-
ments statistics.
Given a grid of noise covariances matrices, the algorithm executes multiple EKF
at every iteration, one for each pair (Q(Ωik),Rk), parallelizing the state estimation.
In the meanwhile, the conditional posterior probability distribution p(Q(Ωik),Rk|Yk)
is also recursively computed using Eq. (2.23) for all the covariances covered by the
grid at the current time step. After all the desired matrices have been processed, the
optimal state noise covariance matrix to be used by the filter is selected according
to the maximum a-posteriori (MAP) criterion:
Qˆk = argmax
Ωik
p(Q(Ωik),Rk|Yk) (2.26)
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Before the next iteration, the algorithm generates new points for the set Sk+1 from
the last posterior pdf values by resorting to the importance sampling method, which
belongs to the Monte Carlo family. Then, a prior PDF is assigned to these points
and the whole estimation and optimization process is repeated again.
At first, the algorithm enters an initialization phase to train the conditional pos-
terior probability distribution through the Bayesian approach, without updating the
grid of parameters and thus keeping the first set S0. The length of this starting period
depends on the dynamic system order and the available measured data. Afterwards,
the iterative generation of new sets of state noise covariances is also enabled in or-
der to improve the search for the maximum by the MAP criterion. Since parameters
with high posterior PDF are desired, those with low probability are suitably replaced
at each time step. The optimization of the matrix Q therefore aims at identifying
and selecting the current optimal (i.e. best possible) estimate among all the possible
state vectors xˆ that are computed through parallel EKFs.
We implemented an algorithm that is an improved version of the recursive es-
timation method described in [46]. Indeed, we devised a mechanism to prevent
the probabilities of all the possible noise covariances from being nullified when the
deterministic model undergoes a fast change in the measured dynamics, as it may
happen with high speeds along critical trajectories. If the conditional posterior pdf
results to be zero for each point of the parametrization grid, the initialization phase
is run again and a new probability distribution shape is then re-formed. The iterative
operation of the algorithm we used is summarized in the diagram of Fig. 2.11.
2.2.5 Numerical results
The overall performance of the presented navigation system is evaluated by simu-
lating the tracking of a fast-moving vehicle on different trajectories as well as on a
whole circuit. In this regard, the chosen figure of merit is root mean square error
(RMSE) of the position estimates that are computed by our quasi-tight GNSS/INS
implementation based on EKF. In order to verify the benefit of recursively adapting
the state noise covariance matrix, the RMSE is calculated both with and without
the proposed optimization process and parallel estimation. For all the tests, the sim-
ulations are repeated 100 times sweeping through the following initial logarithmic
parametrization:
Ω0 = (0.0010, 0.0017, 0.0028, 0.0046, 0.0077,
0.0129, 0.0215, 0.3590, 0.0599, 0.1000)
(2.27)
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For every k-th iteration
Kalman Filter - Time Update equations
Replace a priori information
computed with old parameters ? (k-1) (*)
Compute the likelihood function
Update the posterior conditional pdf
Kalman Filter - Data Update equations
Save a posteriori information
Read and align output observations
and compute measurements residuals
Re-build matrices H(k) and R(k)
Normalize posterior conditional pdf values
Assign next prior conditional pdf values
Perturb the parameters ? (k-1)
associated to lowest probabilities
Generate a new set S(k) including new parameters
Choose a posteriori information
and posterior pdf values to be replaced (*)
Replace prior conditional pdf values
computed with old parameters ? (k-1) (*)
Find the optimal Q through MAP criterion
Select the estimated vector x(k)
computed with optimal Q
For every i-th parameter
After initialization
If the pdf results 
zero, the algorithm 
is re-initialized
Figure 2.11: Stochastic model optimization diagram
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µ σ
eX , eY 0 10m
ev
GNSS
, ev
INS
0 1m/s
eaxbody
, eaybody
0 0.03m/s2
e
θ
0 0.044 rad
Table 2.2: First order statistics of measurement errors
The simulation configuration is briefly characterized as follows. The specific param-
eters that shape the uncertainty affecting the output observations are listed in Table
2.2, where eα is the error vector on the measurement α. Then, we consider an up-
date frequency factor of 10 between the measured data coming from the GNSS and
the INS. As far as the estimation process is concerned, we assume to identify the
exact transition model and observation model for the Kalman filter. This means the
deterministic information are known.
Four different types of trajectories are generated, each one has a simulation time
of 10 seconds, as shown in Fig. 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15. The aim of these tests
is to separately analyze the algorithm efficiency while tracking the basic motions of
a particle-like vehicle. The GNSS/INS estimation process is run with two configu-
rations: a recursively optimized matrix Qˆopt based on parallel filtering and a single
filter with fixed minimal noise covariance matrix that is defined as:
Qmin = Q(Ω
1) = Q(0.001) (2.28)
In other words, we compare the positional accuracy of the optimizing tech-
nique with those achieved with minimum state noise, which hence is associated to
a well-identified deterministic model. The constants characterizing the kinematic
equations and the RMSE values along the X and Y axes for both the configurations
are reported in Table 2.3. The obtained results demonstrate that adapting the noise
covariance enhances the average performance in terms of tracking accuracy, even if
there is just a little uncertainty left on the state, which already represents an advan-
tageous situation. In the simplest case of a linear motion, the RMSE is reduced by
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Figure 2.12: Example of straight line (1)
Figure 2.13: Example of quick turn (2)
Figure 2.14: Example of circular hairpin (3)
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RMSE(Qˆopt) RMSE(Qmin)
X Y X Y
1) aX = 9.4m/s
2 0.46m 0.2m 1.92m 0.3m
2) |v| = 20m/s 0.98m 0.58m 9.98m 11.64m
3) |v| = 10m/s 0.64m 0.35m 7.07m 6.1m
4) |v| = 10m/s 1.28m 1.88m 15.47m 12.58m
Table 2.3: Single racetracks results
a factor of about 4, but the improvement significantly grows as trajectory become
more intricate. Whenever the transition and observation models do not fit the real-
ity, optimizing the filter statistic inputs is expected to be necessary. As far as the
state is concerned, different degrees of uncertainty are investigated by examining the
vehicle moving on a circuit.
A final test is carried out on a circuit clearly inspired inspiration from a typical
scenario of a FSAE competition. The route is designed to assemble all the analyzed
segments with either uniform accelerations or constant velocities, as depicted in Fig.
2.16. In addition to the two previous configurations, we also consider the case of
Figure 2.15: Example of slalom (4)
2.2 Optimal EKF for Quasi-Tightly Coupled GNSS/INS Integration 67
RMSE(Qˆopt) RMSE(Qmin) RMSE(Qrand)
X Y X Y X Y
1.17m 2.39m 9.29m 5.94m 71.5m 39.63m
Table 2.4: Complete circuit results
Figure 2.16: Circuit design with colored vehicle speed
a matrix Qrand that is randomly chosen in the set based on the parameters of Eq.
(2.27). At each simulation, a different state noise covariance is thus entering the
Kalman filter. This event could happen when the deterministic model is poorly
characterized over time. The performance achieved after one lap of 44.06 seconds
are summarized in Table 2.4. As expected, the best accuracy of about 1-2 meters
is enabled by selecting Qopt (Fig. 2.17), whereas Qmin ensures a decent precision
on average, and a random Qrand can cause the EKF to diverge from the actual
positions. Here the improvements reaches again a factor of 4. These results show the
great potentiality of implementing the presented optimization method for a quasi-
tightly coupled GNSS/INS system as well as other automotive applications.
Figure 2.17: Optimized tracking on the circuit under test
Chapter3
Synchronisation of low-cost open SDR
for navigation applications
In the early 2000s, SDR started to gain popularity in the scientific community but,
due to their high cost, they have been accessible only to researchers and not to or-
dinary users. This trend has changed in the last few years with the introduction
of low-cost SDR on the market, which has made this technology available to ev-
eryone. The cost of these devices is at least one order of magnitude lower than a
comparable professional SDR. Moreover most low-cost SDR are open-hardware and
open-software, hence fully customisable. Professional SDR offer time and frequency
synchronisation of multiple SDR, enabling a wide range of navigation applications.
All of these applications require accurate time and frequency synchronisation, but
low-cost SDR generally do not support time synchronisation.
Time and frequency synchronisation of multiple SDR enables or improves a wide
range of navigation applications. It is possible to classify these navigation applica-
tions in two main categories: receiver- and network-oriented applications. Receiver-
oriented applications are the ones that allow a single receiver to compute its own
position, while network-oriented applications are the ones involving more than one
receiver that are not usually colocated.
Receiver-oriented applications may take advantage of the synchronisation of mul-
tiple SDR to build multi-band and/or multi-system receivers. An important exam-
ple of this possible use case is represented by hybrid navigation applications, i.e.,
receivers able to determine their own position by exploiting multiple sources or sys-
tems. This kind of receivers perform ranging measurements from different signals of
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opportunity (SoO) [48], such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Ultrawide Band (UWB), 3G, 4G
Long Term Evolution (LTE), and prospectively 5G, as well as GNSS, in order to solve
the positioning problem. Hence, these receivers must be able to tune their radios to
different bands and demodulate different signals simultaneously. This can be done
by using multiple SDR, but synchronisation is required among them for time-based
or frequency-based ranging. Another possible application falling into this category is
represented by multi-band GNSS receivers, where different GNSS signals in different
frequency bands are simultaneously processed, for better accuracy and robustness in
harsh environments [49].
An example of network-oriented application is cooperative or peer-to-peer (P2P)
positioning [50], in which multiple GNSS users cooperate to achieve a position
solution in difficult environments. In this application, users need to communicate
with each other either to exchange navigation data or to perform terrestrial ranging
between users. The communication between users or the terrestrial ranging can
be implemented using SDR and synchronisation is mandatory for time-based and
frequency-based terrestrial ranging. Another important network-oriented application
is the detection and localisation of GNSS jammers or spoofers: in this case multiple
sensor nodes monitor the GNSS bands and send snapshots of the signal to a server
in the cloud, which detects and localise potential jammers using TDOA and FDOA
[51]. Sensor nodes can be implemented using SDR and strict synchronisation is
required for TDOA/FDOA-based ranging.
Although these navigation applications are feasible with current professional
SDR, they cannot be exploited with very low-cost equipment. In this chapter, we
propose and validate an algorithm that enables sample-level synchronisation of mul-
tiple low-cost SDR by using an off-the-shelf GNSS receiver.
3.1 Open-source and open-hardware SDR
Different definitions of software-defined radio are possible and we adopt the one given
in [52]: a software-defined radio is a radio in which some or all of the physical layer
functions are software defined. In the last decade the cost of SDR has dropped,
enabling a widespread diffusion of this technology. Most of the low-cost SDR are
open-source and open-hardware: schematics and PCB layouts are public; the code of
the firmware and software is available free of charge and can be modified according
to the users’ need. Example of popular low-cost SDR are RTL-SDR [53], a digital
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Figure 3.2: Selected SDB architecture
TV tuner that may be used as SDR (receive only); HackRF One [54], featuring
a wide frequency range and a wide bandwidth (half-duplex transmit and receive),
BladeRF [55], featuring USB 3.0 (full-duplex transmit and receive).
The aforementioned SDR share a common architecture, shown in Figure 3.1: in
receive mode, the signal coming from the antenna is filtered, amplified, and downcon-
verted to baseband by the RF front end and mixer, then the signal is discretised and
quantised by an Analogue to Digital Converter (ADC) and the samples are trans-
mitted to a computer (host) in charge of signal processing, via an USB interface.
In transmit mode, signal samples are fed to a Digital to Analogue Converter (DAC)
through the USB interface, then the signal is upconverted, amplified by the RF front
end, and transmitted.
3.1.1 Selected development board
Our selected development board (SDB) is HackRF One [54], a low-cost open-source
and open-hardware SDR, capable of transmitting or receiving signals from 1 MHz
to 6 GHz. The ADC/DAC operates at up to 20 Msps (8 bit I/Q samples). Base-
band filter and transmit/receive gain are configurable by software, and pin headers
on the PCB allow future expansions. The architecture of the SDB is shown in Fig-
ure 3.2 and it is composed by three stages: RF, Intermediate Frequency (IF), and
baseband (BB). In receive mode, the RF signal is converted to IF by an RFMD
RFFC5071/2, a wideband synthesiser with integrated 6 GHz mixer, and a Maxim
Integrated MAX2837 wireless broadband transceiver, is responsible for the conversion
from IF to BB and the ADC/DAC (codec) functions. A Xilinx XC2C64A Complex
Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) acts as glue logic between the codec and the
NxP LPC43XX micro controller (MCU) which provides the USB interface to the
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user. The same components are responsible for the opposite functions in transmit
mode. The SDB provides clock input and clock output ports for frequency syn-
chronisation of multiple SDR. Time synchronisation is not supported by the current
firmware but, thanks to the hardware and software openness, it is possible to use a
time pulse for time synchronisation purposes. The next section describes in detail
the synchronisation algorithm and the necessary hardware connections.
3.2 Synchronisation Algorithm
In the following we tackle the synchronisation of SDBs in receive mode. A similar
approach may be applied to achieve the same result in transmit mode. The algorithm
can be also applied with minor modification to other open source SDRs with similar
architectures. The idea is to use an expansion pin header on the PCB to add new
signals for time synchronisation: the start of reception should be triggered by a
time pulse; the pulse may be generated by one of the SDBs or by external hardware.
Figure 3.3 shows the hardware connections between two SDBs: the signal SYNC_IN
(pin 16 of the expansion header P28, top and bottom SDBs) is the input for the
synchronisation pulse. SYNC_CMD (pin 15 of the expansion header P28, top SDB)
is the pulse command signal. We consider two configurations: in the first one (A),
the pulse command is generated by one of the SDBs; in the second configuration
(B) the pulse command is the 1PPS signal of a GNSS receiver, i.e., a time pulse
with a one-second period, synchronised with GPS time. While configuration (A)
does not require additional hardware, it requires the receivers to be colocated. In
configuration (B), instead, SDBs may be located far away from each other. Moreover,
in this case, the recordings are synchronised with GPS time. The signals SYNC_IN
and SYNC_CMD are connected to the CPLD, as shown in Figure 3.4, along with
other signals involved in the receive mode. During the initial setup, the center
frequency, filters bandwidth, gains, and ADC sampling rate are configured. Then,
the ADC starts streaming the samples of the received signal to the CPLD (signal
ADC_DATA[7..0]). The samples are available on both rising (I) and falling edge (Q)
of CODEC_CLK. The CPLD simply makes the data (HOST_DATA[7..0]) available
to the MCU on the rising edge of HOST_CLK, whose frequency is doubled with
respect to CODEC_CLK. The MCU communicates to the CPLD the wish to start
the recording, setting HOST_DISABLE to ’0’. At this stage the MCU is ignoring
the data samples and it will continue until the CPLD sets HOST_CAPTURE to
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Figure 3.3: Synchronisation of two SDBs: hardware connections
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’1’. The CPLD controls HOST_CAPTURE in order to ensure the correct alignment
of interleaved I/Q samples. Once the I/Q data alignment is correct, the MCU may
finally start streaming the samples via USB. When the recording phase ends, the
MCU pulls HOST_DISABLE high, to signal the CPLD the end of the recording. A
snippet of the original VHDL controlling the signal HOST_CAPTURE is available
in Listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1: Original VHDL (simplified)
-- MCU ignores data samples when HOST_CAPTURE = ’0’. The following code guarantees
that the MCU receives I/Q interleaved samples with I samples in the odd
positions and Q samples in the even ones.
process(HOST_CLK)
begin
if rising_edge(HOST_CLK) then
if CODEC_CLOCK = ’0’ then
HOST_CAPTURE <= not HOST_DISABLE
end if;
end if;
end process;
 
This architecture leads to the conclusion that signal HOST_CAPTURE is a good
candidate for time synchronisation. In principle, it is sufficient to hold HOST_CAPTURE
low when SYNC_IN is low or HOST_DISABLE is high. This should be enough to
ensure that the synchronisation error is below one sampling period. However, the
time pulse must stay high during the whole receiving phase, otherwise the stream of
samples to the user is interrupted. Therefore, this method does not work with the
1PPS signal, which is typically a low duty-cycle square wave. This approach may
be improved by using a latched version of the signal SYNC_IN, as shown in Listing
3.2. In this case, it is not required that the pulse command stays high during the
whole receiving phase and this approach works with 1PPS signals.
Listing 3.2: Modified VHDL (simplified)
-- The MCU ignores data when HOST_DISABLE=’1’ or sync_in_latched=’0’. The
following code allows multiple SDBs to start receiving samples synchronously.
process(HOST_CLK)
begin
if rising_edge(HOST_CLK) then
if CODEC_CLOCK = ’0’ then
HOST_CAPTURE <= not HOST_DISABLE and sync_in_latched;
end if;
end if;
end process;
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-- When the MCU pulls HOST_DISABLE low, HOST_SYNC_CMD becomes high (the
synchronisation pulse is sent to the other SDBs). sync_in_latched is high when
HOST_DISABLE is low and there is a rising edge of SYNC_IN; it is low when
HOST_DISABLE is high.
process(HOST_DISABLE, SYNC_IN)
begin
SYNC_CMD <= not HOST_DISABLE;
if HOST_DISABLE = ’0’ then
if rising_edge(SYNC_IN) then
sync_in_latched <= SYNC_IN;
end if;
else
sync_in_latched = ’0’;
end if;
end process;
 
In order to validate the synchronisation algorithm, we are using two different ap-
proaches in the next section, based on GNSS and LTE signal processing.
3.3 Experimental Results
This section discusses the laboratory setup, the GNSS and LTE validation ap-
proaches, and the experimental results on the synchronisation offset. A statistical
model is then proposed to characterise the resulting synchronisation offset.
3.3.1 Experimental setup
The experimental testbed is located in the RF Systems and Payload laboratory of
the European Space Agency (ESTEC, The Netherlands). A diagram of the test setup
is shown in Figure 3.5, where the signal source is either a GNSS antenna (GNSS) or
a LTE network emulator (LTE). A high-end active GNSS antenna is located at the
roof of the building in open-sky conditions. The Spirent E2010S network emulator
generates the LTE signal from one base station (BS) at a system bandwidth of 1.4
MHz in AWGN conditions, with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) around 30 dB.
The input signal goes through a RF power divider and then to the two SDBs. A
reference signal of 10 MHz generated by an active hydrogen maser is used to syn-
chronise, in frequency, the clocks of the LTE network emulator and the two SDBs.
The time synchronisation is achieved with square pulse of 1 Hz obtained from either
a GNSS receiver (1PPS) or an Arbitrary Function Generator (AFG). Hardware con-
nections between the synchronisation pulse and the two SDBs, described in Section
3.2, are implemented in a prototyping PCB, as shown in Figure 3.8. The
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Figure 3.8: SDB connection board
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signals received by the SDBs are recorded at a sampling rate Fs by a laptop PC
(host) and processed using either the GNSS- or LTE-based approaches. In order to
obtain statistically stable results, experiments are repeated 1000 times. SDBs are
reset after each recording, to ensure that the experiments are performed in the same
conditions. This has required the modification of the MCU firmware and the SDB
Linux tools: a new function has been added to allow the host to reset SDBs using
the USB interface. A few recordings experienced losses of samples at high sampling
rates, because the slow hard drive installed in the laptop could not cope with the
high data rate sample stream. To avoid this problem signals are recorded in a tmpfs
[56] virtual memory disk, a disk residing in RAM memory. Another possible issue
that may occur is due to the drift of the host clock with respect to GNSS time: if
the host starts a recording when the 1PPS synchronisation pulse is high, the CPLD
will not be able to detect a rising edge and the signal will not be recorded. To avoid
this problem is possible to use a GNSS receiver to synchronise the clock of the host,
using GPSD in combination with NTP [57].
3.3.2 GNSS validation approach
The GNSS validation approach is based on the estimation of the position, velocity
and time (PVT) solution using the SoftGNSS v3.0 software GPS receiver [58]. This
software was originally meant to work at IF with real samples, but the recordings
captured by the SDBs are at BB and the samples are complex. Therefore, we mod-
ified the acquisition and tracking stages of SoftGNSS, in order to be able to work
with this kind of signals. A further modification to the acquisition and the tracking
phases has been done in order to use the same satellites: only the satellites that are
visible to both SDBs are taken into account for acquisition and tracking, in order to
have comparable solution accuracies for both SDBs. Moreover, the software requires
at least 36 seconds of recorded signals, in order to compute a PVT solution. This is
due to the fact that the receiver needs to demodulate the navigation data, in order
to extract the ephemeris and determine the orbit of the visible satellites: the receiver
needs to demodulate 5 subframes, each composed by 300 bits (6 s, since the bit time
is 20 ms). The additional 6 seconds are needed because the tracking phase may start
in the middle of a subframe. Since processing 36-seconds recordings is cumbersome
and time consuming, we propose an assisted GNSS (A-GNSS) method: instead of
retrieving the ephemeris data from the signals, we download Receiver Independent
Exchange Format (RINEX) files coming from the International GNSS Service (IGS)
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station located in Delft. IGS provides open access, high quality GNSS data, prod-
ucts, and services in support of research. The data downloaded from the IGS station
is used to assist the SoftGNSS receiver and allows to obtain a PVT solution in ten
seconds. The knowledge of the time of week (TOW), which is the number of 1.5
seconds elapsed from the beginning of the GPS week, is still required to compute the
pseudorange measurements and hence, to obtain the navigation solution. The TOW
can be read at the beginning of each subframe, therefore requires to demodulate at
least 6 seconds of GPS signal. In order to further reduce the processing time, we
applied the so-called coarse time positioning method [59], which allows to obtain a
navigation solution without the need of reading the TOW. In this method, the time
of week is treated as an additional unknown by the least squares algorithm, therefore
the unknown navigation solution vector is (X,Y, Z, c dt, tW )T , where (X,Y, Z) is the
position of the receiver, dt is the clock offset between the GPS time and the time
of the receiver, c is the light velocity, and tW is the TOW. The observation model
relating pseudoranges to the navigation solution vector is given by
Pi =
√
(Xi −X)2 + (Yi − Y )2 + (Zi − Z)2 + c dt+ cfd,i
fL1
tW + ei, (3.1)
where (Xi, Yi, Zi) is the position of i-th satellite, fd,i is the Doppler frequency, fL1
is L1 band center frequency, i.e., 1575.42 MHz, and ei is a measurement error term.
Using this model, the least squares algorithm requires at least five visible satellites in
order to find a navigation solution. If the total number of visible satellite is N , the
geometry matrix, i.e., the Jacobian matrix of the observation model, A ∈MN×5(R)
is given by
A =

∆x1 ∆y1 ∆z1 1 cfd,1/fL1
∆x2 ∆y2 ∆z2 1 cfd,2/fL1
...
...
...
...
...
∆xN ∆yN ∆zN 1 cfd,N/fL1
 , (3.2)
where the first four columns are unchanged with respect to the traditional least
squares navigation algorithm [58], and the last column is added for the TOW es-
timation. The synchronisation offset between the two SDBs is computed after the
PVT solution, as the difference between the clock offsets of the two SDRs, i.e.,
θ = dt0−dt1. The GNSS approach is summarised in Figure 3.6. Since GNSS signals
have been specifically designed for precise timing, the use of GNSS signals can be a
natural choice to validate the proposed synchronisation method. However, a number
of possible problems may arise using this approach. The most important drawback
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Figure 3.9: Synchronisation offset using the GNSS approach
of this validation method is that the accuracy of the clock offset estimator is not
constant and depends on the number of visible satellites, on the carrier-to-noise-
density ratio (C/N0) of the received signals, and on the geometry of the satellite
constellation. The high variability of the aforementioned accuracy and the fact that,
occasionally it is not easy to have the same five satellites visible to both SDBs, make
the use of this validation method impractical and the analysis of results troublesome.
An example of synchronisation offset between the two SDBs obtained with the GNSS
approach is shown in Figure 3.9. The synchronisation offset is estimated every 1 ms
in a 5 seconds recording taken at a sampling frequency Fs = 10 MHz. The synchro-
nisation offset, in this case, should be limited to ±1/Fs = ±100 ns but, in spite of
the fact that the majority of the estimates fall within this interval, many outliers are
present. This phenomenon is due to the low accuracy of the clock offset estimation
caused by low C/N0. Therefore, the GNSS approach is in practice cumbersome with
the original least squares algorithm because it requires 36 seconds of data and it is
not accurate enough when using the coarse time method with the described modifi-
cation of the SoftGNSS receiver. In the following, we present a simpler yet effective
LTE-based validation approach.
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3.3.3 LTE validation approach
Terrestrial signals can be used as signals of opportunity to validate or calibrate
the synchronisation procedure, in case there is a lack of visible GNSS satellites.
This opportunistic approach can be based on cellular systems (e.g. 2G, 3G or 4G),
broadcast television (e.g. DVB-T), Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or any other radio signal. The
selection of the opportunistic system depends on the signal availability, and the signal
bandwidth to achieve a certain time-delay estimation (TDE) accuracy. An accessible
time reference within the signal can be useful to validate the synchronisation over
time. Thus, this thesis considers the 4G LTE system due to its wide adoption in
urban environments, high signal bandwidth (up to 20 MHz), and periodical time
reference, i.e. system frame number (SFN) every 10 ms. In contrast to the GNSS
approach described in the previous section, the LTE validation procedure is based on
the estimation of the time-delay from the signal transmitted by a single base station
with unknown location.
As it is shown in Figure 3.5 and 3.7, the LTE signal is first split and fed to
the two SDBs that record a snapshot of 200 ms. The signal is then resampled to 2
MHz. The UAB LTE SDR software receiver, which is described in [60] and [61],
is used to acquire and track the 1.4-MHz LTE signal captured by each SDB. The
noise bandwidth of the delay-locked loop and frequency-locked loop is set to 30 Hz
and 50 Hz, respectively, and the resolution of the TDE is defined to 0.25 ns. The
SFN is calculated by using the LTE Cell Scanner software developed by [62]. Only
ten LTE radio frames are tracked, and the last time-delay estimate of each processed
capture is used to calculate the synchronisation offset between the two SDBs. The
synchronisation is validated between multiple captures by using the time between
recordings and the SFN.
3.3.4 Synchronisation offset
The PDF of the synchronisation offset is computed based on the LTE approach, by
considering the 1PPS and AFG pulses. As it is shown in Figure 3.10, the resulting
synchronisation offset is within ±1/Fs, i.e., ±200, ±100 and ±50 ns for Fs equal
to 5, 10 and 20 MHz, respectively. This test confirms the achievable accuracy of
the proposed synchronisation procedure, which is bounded by the sampling period
of the SDB. In addition, the same results are obtained with both synchronisation
pulses, demonstrating the flexibility and reproducibility of the proposed algorithm.
These results are validated by measuring the error of the TDE. As it is shown in
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Figure 3.10: PDF of the synchronisation offset using the LTE approach
Figure 3.11, the PDF of this error is confined within ±5 ns. Thus, the estimation
error of the test practically has no effect on the results. The mean µθ and standard
deviation σθ of the synchronisation offset and the mean µτ and standard deviation
στ of the TDE error can be seen in Table 3.0(a). The main difference between the
use of a synchronisation pulse generated by a GNSS receiver and a signal generator
is the clock drift. Since the GNSS receiver is synchronised to the accurate atomic
clocks of the satellites, the resulting square pulse is very stable. In contrast, the
synchronisation pulse of the AFG has a clock drift due to its local oscillator. This
effect can be observed in Figure 3.12, where the TDE of a single SDB is plotted over
time. The TDE obtained with the AFG for different signal captures has a noticeable
drift, which is wrapped to 10 ms (i.e., length of a radio frame) in the case of LTE,
while there is no TDE drift with 1PPS.
3.3.5 Statistical model of the synchronisation offset
Due to the familiarity of the previous test results, a statistical model is here defined to
characterise the synchronisation offset of the proposed algorithm. For this purpose,
the synchronisation offset is normalised by 1/Fs for each test, resulting in the bar
plot of Figure 3.13. These results lead to the conclusion that a truncated normal
distribution [63] can fit the synchronisation offset to the algorithm. Thus, the
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Figure 3.11: PDF of TDE error with the LTE approach
(a)
Sampling Signal Sync. Sync. offset TDE error
frequency source pulse µθ (ns) σθ (ns) µτ (ns) στ (ns)
5 MHz LTE AFG 1.45 82.56 0.40 1.34
1PPS -0.55 80.10 0.44 1.34
10 MHz LTE AFG 2.12 40.19 0.47 1.32
1PPS 0.91 40.69 0.42 1.36
20 MHz LTE AFG 0.60 19.73 0.49 1.46
1PPS 0.81 20.62 0.13 1.49
(b)
Signal Normalised Sync. offset
source µθ (samples) σθ (samples)
LTE 0.01 0.40
Table 3.1: Mean µθ and standard deviation σθ of the synchronisation offset and TDE
error for the LTE approach.
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Figure 3.12: Synchronisation offset over time with the LTE approach
resulting synchronisation offset can be modelled as
θ ∼
N (µθ, σθ), if θ ∈ (−1, 1),0, otherwise, (3.3)
where the PDF of the truncated Gaussian distribution is
f(θ, µθ, σθ) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
{
−(θ − µθ)
2
2σ2
}
1
2
erf
{
1− µθ
σθ
√
2
}
− 1
2
erf
{−1− µθ
σθ
√
2
} , (3.4)
and erf {·} is the error function. The truncated normal distribution is shown in
Figure 3.13 by using the fitting parameters of Table 3.0(b), obtained with maximum
likelihood estimators [63]. The observed resemblance suggests the validity of the
model and confirms the performance of the proposed synchronisation method, whose
accuracy is confined within a sampling period.
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Figure 3.13: Statistical model of the synchronisation offset

Chapter4
Conclusions
This thesis dealt with the problem of interference detection, localization, and miti-
gation in GNSS. The problem has been tackled in a cooperative fashion. The JJDL
algorithm has been proposed for the detection and localization of jamming inter-
ference sources. The algorithm guarantees a constant false alarm rate with an easy
design flow. The algorithm is customizable in order to cope with different localization
techniques, and here two different flavours have been presented.
The DSWE algorithm has been proposed as a cooperative jamming waveform
estimation tool, suitable for interference cancellation. The problem of interference
mitigation has been tackled also from the point of view of GNSS and INS integration,
thanks to an optimized implementation of the quasi-tight integration paradigm.
Finally, the development of a new strategy for synchronization of low-cost software-
defined radios has allowed the succesful implementation of the TDOA/FDOA-based
JJDL algorithm on low-cost hardware.

AppendixA
Kalman filters
A.1 Kalman filters
The Kalman filter (KF) is a linear recursive MMSE estimator of a hidden system
state (i.e. not directly measurable) as a function of the previous estimate and of
multiple sequential observations [34]. According to a discrete formulation of the
problem, given k time samples, the actual state vector xk is described as a linear
dynamic system having the form:
xk = Akxk−1 + Bkuk + wk (A.1)
where Ak is the matrix representing the transition model (i.e. free evolution), Bk is
the control model (i.e. forced response), uk is the input control vector, and wk is the
state noise vector. The actual state vector xk is also linearly related to the current
output measurements vector yk through:
yk = Hkxk + vk (A.2)
where Hk is the observation model and vk is the measurement noise vector. The
problem consists in computing the estimate xˆ of the actual state xk from the obser-
vations y0, . . . ,yk, so as to minimize the expected value E{·} of the squared norm
of the unknown estimation error vector ek, defined as:
ek = xk − xˆk (A.3)
The KF is a computational efficient solution that provides optimal estimation under
the following hypothesis:
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• the vectors wk and vk are white-noise sequences and thus also mutually inde-
pendent and independent of the initial state vector x0:
E
{
vkw
T
k
}
= E
{
vkx
T
0
}
= E
{
wkx
T
0
}
= 0, ∀k, j ∈ N \ {0} (A.4)
• the real dynamic system is accurately identified, both in its deterministic inputs
consisting of the model matrices Ak , Bk , and Hk and in its stochastic inputs
represented by the vectors wk and vk.
Hence, if a reliable description of the system and of its initial conditions is available,
the KF recursively provides maximum likelihood estimates of the state xˆk and of its
error covariance matrix Pk that satisfy the following equalities:
E{ek} =0 (A.5)
Pk = E{ekeTk } (A.6)
xˆk = arg min
xˆk
E{‖ek‖2} = arg min
xˆk
Tr(Pk) (A.7)
Moreover, let us suppose the entering noise vectors wk and vk to have a multivariate
Gaussian distributionN with zero mean and known covariance matrices, respectively
denoted as Qk and Rk:
wk ≈∼N (0,Qk) (A.8)
vk ≈∼N (0,Rk) (A.9)
In particular, the matrices Qk and Rk are chosen to reflect the degree of confidence
that is placed in the model eq. (A.1) and (A.2), respectively. In case the KF ensures
estimation optimality and is affected by AWGN, its operation may be expressed as
the recursion of a system of simple equations defined in two steps: time update and
data update. In the first phase, the a priori estimates x−k and P
−
k are predicted by
projecting the previous estimates as follows:{
xˆ−k = Akxˆk−1 + Bkuk (A.10a)
P−k = AkPk−1A
T
k + Qk (A.10b)
The error εk associated to the predicted output measurements yˆk is called innovation
(or residual). Note that, under the conditions underlying the previous assumptions,
the residuals are expected to form a white-noise Gaussian sequence. In other words,
the error statistics propagate through the linear system dynamics. Consequently,
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the whiteness property of the residual sequence may be considered as a measure of
filter performance.
εk =yk − yˆk = yk −Hkxˆ−k ∼ N (0,Sk) (A.11)
Sk =HkP
−
k H
T
k + Rk (A.12)
In the second phase, the state estimate is refined a posteriori by a weighted average
that combines the a priori state predictions with the current residual εk through the
Kalman optimal gain Kk:
Kk =P
−
k H
T
k S
−1
k (A.13){
xˆk = xˆ
−
k + Kkεk (A.14a)
Pk = P
−
k −KkHkP−k (A.14b)
In the next subsection, the KF theory is applied to nonlinear systems.
A.1.1 Extended Kalman filter
Given a generic discrete-time nonlinear dynamic system, such as:
xk =fk(xk−1,uk−1,wk) (A.15)
yk =hk(xk,vk) (A.16)
where fk and hk are used to denote differentiable nonlinear functions. The EKF is an
efficient method for nonlinear estimation. At each step, it essentially provides first-
order approximations (Taylor series expansion) to the actual model terms around
the mean value x¯k predicted for the current state xk, as shown below:
xk ≈x¯k + Ak(xk−1 − xˆk−1) + wk−1 (A.17)
yk ≈y¯k + Hk(xk − xˆk + vk (A.18)
x¯k = E {fk(xˆk−1,uk−1,wk)} = fk( ˆxk−1,uk−1,0) , xˆ−k (A.19)
y¯k = E{hk(x¯k,vk)} = hk(x¯k,0) , yˆk (A.20)
where Ak and Hk are computed as the Jacobian matrices of ! and h respectively;
they describe the linear deviations from the reference mean values x¯k and y¯k. Such a
linear approximation however impairs the accuracy of the system model and can lead
to a suboptimal performance and even divergence of the filter. In order to control
the divergence, the noise covariance matrices Qk and Rk can be tuned so that the
residuals feature the desired statistical distribution, which is white and Gaussian,
according to the initial assumptions.
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A.1.2 Observability
As a recursive least-squares estimator, the KF relies on the fact that the errors can be
averaged out by suitably combining more observations than the number strictly nec-
essary to determine the desired unknowns. For a discrete-time system, observability
means that the redundant observation of the output measurements over a time span
{t1, . . . , tk} provides sufficient information to estimate the initial state x0 [64]. This,
along with the knowledge of the system model, uniquely specifies the state vector at
each time instant. In particular, a system is defined observable when the rank of its
so-called observability matrix is maximum. This test returns a binary response that
nevertheless does not provide any insight into the current degree of observability of
the system. On the contrary, the eigenvalues λi of the error covariance matrix Pk are
proved to be equal to the variances of the different linear combinations of the state
components. Indeed, the least observable linear combination of state components is
indicated by the largest eigenvalue of !!, while the most observable one is evidenced
by the smallest eigenvalue. According to eq. (A.7), it is plain to see that the system
gets more observable as the KF optimally minimizes the mean square error:
Tr(Pk) =
∑
i
λi (A.21)
Finally, it is convenient to adopt the following normalization in order to obtain
adimensional eigenvalues:
P
′
k = (P0)
−1 Pk (P0)−1 (A.22)
A.2 Energy detection
Given a certain bandwidth, the problem of the detecting an unknown signal can be
effectively solved by means of a precise radiometer [65]. The energy detection indeed
applies to any deterministic signal, as far as its statistical characteristics are known,
and is regardless of its waveform structure. By assuming a discrete AWGN channel,
the energy measured over a certain sensing time returns a decision test static T
consisting of the sum of N squares of Gaussian variables:
T (ri) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
|ri[n]|2 (A.23)
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where ri refers a generic received sample vector. A suitable sampling span is chosen
in order to have a sufficient number of terms:
N ≥ T0B (A.24)
where T0 is the observation interval and B denotes the band of interest. Under the
simplifying assumption of having no uncertainty on the entering noise, the test statis-
tic is approximated by a normal distribution N whether the signal is hypothesized
present (H1) or absent (H0):
T (ri) ∼

N
(
σ2,
2σ4
N
)
if H0 (A.25a)
N
(
P + σ2,
2(P + σ2)2
N
)
if H1 (A.25b)
where P is the received signal power and σ2 is the noise variance that identify the
SNR, SNR = P/σ2. Hence, the energy detection is characterized by the following
theoretical probabilities of false alarm Pfa and missed detection Pmd:
Pfa = Prob {T (ri) > ξ|H0} = Q
 ξ − σ2√
2
N σ
2
 (A.26)
Pmd = Prob {T (ri) < ξ|H1} = 1−Q
 ξ − (P + σ2)√
2
N (P + σ
2)
 (A.27)
in which Q(·) represents the complementary cumulative density function of the stan-
dard normal distribution and ξ is the radiometer threshold. As a consequence of
these approximations, any input signal results to be detectable at arbitrarily low
SNR by increasing the number N of samples. In other words, the so-called SNR wall
is neglected, as the energy detection is supposed robust to channel modelling uncer-
tainties. By fixing a target Pfa it is possible to obtain a constant false alarm energy
detector in which the test threshold may be computed by inverting eq. (A.26):
ξ =
√
2
N
σ2Q−1(Pfa) + σ2 (A.28)
where Q−1(·) is the inverse of Q(·).
A.3 Estimation bounds
The Cramér-Rao bound (CRB) provides the estimation performance lower bound.
When an EKF is used, the CRB depends on the accuracy of the deterministic and
stochastic models.
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A.3.1 Accuracy of TDOA and FDOA measurements
The accuracy of TDOA and FDOA estimation using CAF is given in [33]:
σTDOA =
1
β
√
BTSi
(A.29)
σFDOA =
1
Te
√
BTSi
(A.30)
where B is the emitter signal bandwidth, T is the observation interval, Si is the
input SNR. β and Te are the root mean square (RMS) bandwidth and duration of
the emitter signal, respectively:
β = 2pi
√√√√∫ +∞−∞ f2Ws(f) df∫ +∞
−∞ Ws(f) df
(A.31)
Te = 2pi
√√√√∫ +∞−∞ t2 |a(t)|dt∫ +∞
−∞ |a(t)|dt
(A.32)
where Ws(f) denotes the emitter signal power spectral density and |a(t)| indicates
the emitter signal complex envelope. Using σTDOA and σFDOA it is possible to
build the optimal EKF measurement error covariance matrix Rk. The process noise
covariance matrix Qk can be optimized as described in §2.2.3. Once those two
matrices are known, it is possible to compute the CRB.
A.3.2 Cramér Rao bound for EKF
The posterior CRB for EKF is given in [66]. In the specific case of TDOA/FDOA-
based localization. The Fisher information matrix (FIM) can be computed iteratively
as
Jk = Q
−1
k H
T
kR
−1
k Hk −
(
ATkQ
−1
k
)T (
Jk−1 + AkQ−1k A
T
)−1
ATkQ
−1
k (A.33)
The initial FIM J0 can be set according to the available a-priori information. The
CRB is then
Pk ≥ CRB = J−k 1 (A.34)
where A ≥ B indicates that A−B is positive definite. In order to compare position
errors and velocity estimation errors with the CRB we define the SR-CRB as
σSR−CRB =
√
Tr J−1k (A.35)
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A.4 Karhunen-Loéve expansion
KLE is a promising signal processing method because provides some advantages with
respect to Fourier series (FS) Both KLE and FS provide a spectral decomposition
of the signal using a set of basis functions, KLE is more flexible because its basis
function can be of any form, the basis functions can be tailored to a specific signal
in order to have a better spectral decomposition. FS basis functions are limited to
sine and cosine [67] [40]. KLE merges deterministic and stochastic analyses of the
signal; although the set of basis function is deterministic, it also provides stochastic
information about the signal. KLE weighs the basis functions with respect to their
probable power contribution, allowing one to efficiently distinguish the signal from
the noise. On the other hand, FS uses only one parameter per basis function that
represents its exact power. Moreover, KLE is able to detect much weaker signals
than FS or Fourier Transform, because of the ability to separate stochastic and
deterministic informations. The main disadvantage of KLE with respect to FS is
the complexity. it is well known that FS?s complexity is of O(n · log(n)), while KLE
complexity is much higher, O(n2). This difference is due to the basis functions: FS
uses predefined basis functions, while KLE looks for the best representation for each
individual signal.
A.4.1 From Fourier series to Karhunen-Loéve expansion
FS and KLE have many similarities, but also many differences. As well known any
periodic signal can be represented as a Fourier series:
x(t) =
a0
2
+
∞∑
n=1
[an cos (ωnt) + bn sin (ωnt)] (A.36)
where the coefficients are
an =
2
T
∫
T
x(t) cos(ωn) dt (A.37)
bn =
2
T
∫
T
x(t) sin(ωn) dt (A.38)
These coefficients are the projection of the basis functions (sine and cosine) on the
signal. In an similar way, it is possible to represent a stochastic process X(t) over
the finite time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T using KLE:
X(t) =
∞∑
n=1
ZnΦn(t) (A.39)
96 Kalman filters
Now the coefficients Zn are random variables, and the deterministic functions Φn
are eigenfunctions. These can assume any form as long as they are orthonormal.
Similarly to the coefficients of Fourier series, KLE coefficients are obtained projecting
the signal onto the eigenfunctions:
Zn =
∫ T
0
X(t)Φn(t) dt (A.40)
Since Zn are random variables, their variance is more important than the coefficients
themselves. The variance is in fact the eigenvalue λn associated to the eigenfunction
φn(t). Each eigenvalue represents the expected power of the corresponding eigen-
function. KLE computes at first the covariance of the processed signal and then
allows to find eigenvalues and eigenfunctions:∫ T
0
E {X(t1)X(t2)Φn(t1) dt1} = λnΦn(t2) (A.41)
Assuming E {X(t)} = 0, E {X(t1)X(t2)} is the autocovariance of the process X(t)
at the instants t1 and t2. This is the only known quantity of eq. (A.41); eigenvalues
and eigenfunctions are unknown. If we represents X(t) in the discrete-time, the same
equation becomes:
N∑
k=1
E {XkXl}Φn,k∆t = λnΦn,l (A.42)
which is a set of N linear equations in N unknowns; the autocovariance is now a
Toeplitz matrix E {XkXl} ∈ MN (R) and ∆t denotes the sampling interval. Equa-
tion (A.42) can be solved using linear algebra and always admits an unique solution.
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